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PUBLIC SCHOOL DRUG SEARCHES:
TOWARD REDEFINING FOURTH AMENDMENT
"REASONABLENESS" TO INCLUDE
INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
I.

Introduction

Incidents of illegal drug use' and violent crime 2 plague public
school authorities across the nation. As narcotics and weapons appear
on school campuses, school officials seek to conduct searches of
1. Federal Government statistics released on January 7, 1985, indicated that
although overall drug use by high school students slightly declined during 1984,
the use of cocaine slightly increased. Brinkley, Drug Use in High Schools Down,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1985, at B5, col. 1. Two 1984 surveys of high school seniors
revealed current cocaine use at 1106 in New York and 13% in Massachusetts. Id.
These findings indicate a "trend toward earlier and more extensive involvement in
substance use . . . that may appear in a national survey of high school seniors
in 1985-1986." Keyes & Block, Prevalence and Patterns of Substance Use Among
Early Adolescents, 13 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 1, 12 (1984). Among high school
seniors surveyed in 1983, 93% of the students had used alcohol at some time
during their lives; 27% had used stimulants; 16% had used cocaine; 15% had used
hallucinogens, including LSD and PCP; 14% had used tranquilizers, sedatives or
barbituates; 14% had used inhalants; and 10% had used opiates other than heroin.
TEEN DRUG USE 2 (G. Beschner & A. Friedman ed. 1986) [hereinafter cited as
TEEN DRUG USE]. A large scale study indicated that 570o of the American student
population tried marijuana by twelfth grade, and 5.5% use marijuana daily. See
Johnston, O'Malley & Buchanan, Highlights From "Drugs and American High
School Students, 1975-1983, " NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DRUG ABUSE, DHHS PunLICATION No. (ADM) 84-1317 (1984) (providing data for each year from 19751983). An alarming 1983 study reported that by the time students reach seventh
grade, nearly one-half of the surveyed population had experienced peer pressure
urging them to try marijuana. See TEEN DRUG USE, supra, at 1 (citing Borton,

Pressure to Try Drugs, Alcohol Starts in Early Grades,

WEEKLY READER

(April

25, 1983)).
For a general discussion of drug use among juveniles and young adults, see TEEN
DRUG USE, supra; J. POUCH, P. ELLICKSON, P. REUTER & J. KAHAN, STRATEGIES
FOR CONTROLLING ADOLESCENT DRUG USE
ISSUES & TREATMENT (G. Beschner & A.

(1984); YOUTH DRUG ABUSE: PROBLEMS,
Friedman ed. 1979); G. UELMEN & V.

CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS ON DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW (1985);
Schwartz, A Study of Drug Discipline Policies in Secondary Schools, 19 ADOLESCENCE 323 (1984); Watters, Reinarman & Fagan, Causality, Context, and ContinHADDOX,

gency: Relationships Between Drug Abuse and Delinquency,

CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS.

351 (1985).
2. See SCHOOL CRIME AND DISRUrTION (Ernst, Wenk & Harlow ed. 1978);
VIOLENCE AND CR
IN THE SCHOOLS (K. Baker & R. Rubel ed. 1980); N.Y. Times,
Oct. 29, 1985, at A16, col. 6 (Boston school officials met to consider instituting
routine locker searches to prevent students from carrying weapons in school); King,
School Vigilante Group Is Linked to 35 Felonies, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1985, at
A29, col. 1 (Texas student vigilante group suspected of committing violent felonies
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students' lockers, property, and persons for contraband or prohibited
weapons. 3 Public school authorities justify their actions by stating
that since the state requires children to attend school, 4 the state
retains a compelling interest, if not an affirmative duty, in ensuring

in attempt to threaten fellow students engaging in criminal activity at school); N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1985, at B2, col. 2 (teacher at Brooklyn public high school stabbed
in school building by 16 year old student); Friendly, Is Violence Exaggerated?,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at Cl, col. I (examining levels of violence in different
public school systems). But see N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1985, at B8, col. 2 (New
York City public school weapons incidents decreased 28% during the first four
months of the 1984-1985 school year).
3. Detroit recently assigned law enforcement officers to conduct weapons searches
in high schools; part of New York City's annual budget is reserved to pay security
guards in elementary schools; and California amended its state constitution to require
more careful records of search incidents involved on school campuses. Friendly,
Is Violence Exaggerated?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at CIO, col. 3; see also J.
HooAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 117-19 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as HOOAN]; 3 W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AmENDMENT § 10.11 (1978 & Supp. 1986) (general discussion of
searches directed at students) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].

4.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28-3 (1977 & Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT.

§ 14.30.010 (Supp. 1985); ARIZ.
ARK. STAT. ANN.

REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802 (1984 & Supp. 1985);

§§ 80-1502 to -1503 (1980 & Supp. 1985); CAL. EDUC. CODE

§ 48200 (West 1978); COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-33-104 (1974 & Supp. 1984); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2702 (1981 & Supp. 1984);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-401 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 232.01 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986);

GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1 (Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 298-9 (1976 &
Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (1965);
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-3-17 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1 (West 1949
& Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-111 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 159.010 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:221 (West
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A, § 5001-A (Supp. 1985); MD. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 7-301 (1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 1 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1978 &
Supp. 1985); MICH. Comr. LAWS ANN. § 380.1561 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT.
§ 120.10 (1960 & Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (1985); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 167.031 (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-102 to
5-103 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-201 (1981 & Supp. 1984); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 392.040 (Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.1 (1978 & Supp. 1985); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-2 (1984); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW §§ 3201, 3206 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983
& Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 15-34.1 (1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
99 3321.02-.04 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 10-105 (West 1972 & Supp.
1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.010 (Supp. 1985); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 131327 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-19-1 (1981 & Supp. 1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIED
LAWS ANN. § 13-27-1 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3001 (1983 & Supp. 1985);
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.032 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53-24-1 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (1974 & Supp. 1985); VA. CODE
§§ 22.1-254 to -255 (1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.27.010 (1983 & Supp.
1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 18-8-1, -8-la (1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (1973 &
Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-102 (1977 & Supp. 1985).
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that the school environment remain free of illegal substances which
might present safety hazards to teachers or fellow students.,
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 6 was
adopted to protect individual citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures. 7 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,8 the Supreme Court held
the fourth amendment applicable to school searches and recognized
that students have some constitutionally protected expectation of
privacy in their belongings." However, the majority ultimately de-

5. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
6.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. The fourth amendment was passed in reaction to the oppressive "general warrants" commonly issued by the English Crown which authorized searches of private
premises owned by persons who criticized the state, and the "writs of assistance,"
which allowed colonial customs inspectors to search for and seize smuggled goods.
See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360, 363-66 (1959); see also J.W. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 1.1l-1.15 (1982
ed. & Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]. Compare Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CIwm. L. REv. 257,
283-88 (1984) with Harris, The Return to Common Sense: A Response to "The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment", 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 25, 27-29 (1984).
8. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Greenhouse, High Court Eases Search Strictures In
Public Schools, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1985, at Al, col. 6. For a complete discussion
of New Jersey v. T.L.O., see infra notes 63-101 and accompanying text.
9. Although the United States Constitution does not expressly include a right
to privacy, the Supreme Court has held that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from these guarantees that help
give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citation omitted) (Connecticut statute
forbidding use of contraceptives struck down as unconstitutional violation of right
to privacy in marital relationship); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (recognizing "right of privacy" implied by fourth amendment).
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court expressly
stated that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
'right to privacy.' " Id. at 350 (electronic surveillance conducted in public phone
booth violated user's reasonable expectation of privacy). Instead, the Court explained that the U.S. Constitution protects a person's legitimate expectation of
privacy. In Katz, the Court stated that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion established two criteria which a reasonable expectation of privacy
must satisfy. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The person must actually manifest
his subjective expectation of privacy and the expectation must be one which society
recognizes as reasonable. Id.
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cided" that the prevalence of student drug use" and the uniqueness
of the school setting 2 would allow school authorities to invade
students' privacy rights and conduct searches for prohibited substances upon "reasonable suspicion" or "reasonable cause," rather
than the higher traditional standard of "probable cause."' 3
The Court did not establish fixed criteria concerning the type of
information necessary to support a "reasonable suspicion" that a
student possesses contraband. 14 Thus, a crucial unaddressed issue
remains whether a student search should be deemed valid if, prior
to the, search, school officials lacked individualized suspicion' 5 that

The Supreme Court recently stated that the concept of a legitimate expectation
of privacy by definition "is critically different from the mere expectation, however
well justified, that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities,"
because "[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season
may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not
one which the law recognizes as 'legitimate' . . . [or] 'that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.' " United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 n.22
(1984) (citations omitted) (fourth amendment did not require government narcotics
agents to obtain warrant before performing field tests on damaged package discovered by private freight carrier).
The modern application of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard is
that if no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the area searched, there is
no "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and fourth amendment
requirements do not govern the search at issue. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text; see also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 3, § 2.1 (discussing
history and evolution of Katz expectation of privacy standard).
10. Justice White wrote the Court's opinion, which was joined by Justices
Burger and Rehnquist. 105 S. Ct. 733, 736 (1985). Justices Powell and O'Connor
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 747. Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurring
opinion. Id. at 748. Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan filed opinions concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 750, 759.
11. Id. at 742.
12. Id. at 743, 747 (Powell & O'Connor, J.J., concurring).
13. Id. at 743-44. For an examination of probable cause, see infra notes 55,
73.
14. Instead, the Court employed a balancing test described infra notes 96-101
and accompanying text.
15. Justice Brennan defined "individualized suspicion" in the context of a school
search for illegal narcotics:
At the time of the raid, school authorities possessed no particularized
information as to drugs or contraband, suppliers or users. Furthermore,
they had made no effort to focus the search on particular individuals
who might have been engaged in drug activity at school. The authorities
had no more than a generalized, hope that their sweeping investigative
techniques would lead to the discovery of contraband.
Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (emphasis added). Several courts have expressly held that the reasonable
suspicion standard requires individualized suspicion. See Horton v. Goose Creek
Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207 (1983), infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text; Bellnier v. Lund,
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a particular student or group of students had violated a criminal
law or school rule.' 6 If individualized suspicion is not an essential
element of the requisite reasonable suspicion, school authorities could
conceivably form a subjective assessment of the student population,
determine that a drug use problem exists, and then proceed to
randomly search some or all students to locate contraband which
may or may not be present.' 7
The possibility of dragnet searches for contraband grows more
alarming as the potential scope of student searches widens. Since
the late 1960's, school officials have conducted three major types
of searches at public high schools.' 8 The least invasive searches were
typically of a school locker, 19 an automobile, 20 or a student's personal

property, such as a handbag, 2' or piece of luggage. 222aMore invasive
searches include narcotic detection dogs sniffing lockers and persons2

438 F. Supp. 47, 53-54 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); infra, notes 204-07 and accompanying
text; Kuehn v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078
(1985) (en banc); infra note 294.
In the criminal law context, "some quantum of individualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure .... But the Fourth

Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976) (citation omitted) (border patrol's
routine stop of vehicle did not require individualized suspicion that particular vehicle
contained illegal aliens); cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
(searches conducted by roving border patrol require specific evidence of wrongdoing
by target individuals). Similarly, in the context of administrative searches, the
Supreme Court held that an "area" warrant was sufficient to support the reasonableness of inspecting private residences within a particular neighborhood for
building code violations, and specific knowledge of the condition of the particular
dwelling was unnecessary. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
For a discussion of individualized suspicion in the school context, see infra notes
291-304 and accompanying text.
16. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 (1985) (student search
permissible if school officials had reasonable suspicion that student had violated
school rules).
17. See Margolick, Students and Privacy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at B4,
col. 5.
18. See generally HOAN, supra note 3, at 117-19 (discussing search and seizure
in school setting); Note, Students and the Fourth Amendment: "The Torturable

Class", 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 709, 709-11 (1983) (same).
19. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text (discussion of locker searches).
20. For a discussion of Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d
470 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983), and Jones
v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980), see infra notes
138-49 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985), see infra
notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of Kuehn v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d
594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (en banc), see infra note 292.
23. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text.
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to uncover illegal drugs. Until recently, the most invasive school
searches were student body searches, which ranged from a patdown 25 to a full strip search.2 6 However, during the past year, several
schools have instituted policies requiring students to undergo urinalysis testing in order to detect drug use.2 7
This Note examines the conflict between a school's right to preserve
educational safety and a student's right to privacy in his possessions,
his person, and his body fluids. Section II addresses the history of
the fourth amendment and its application to public schoolchildren.
Section III discusses New Jersey v. T.L.O. and the decision's impact
on school search law. Sections IV and V employ the T.L.O. balancing
test to evaluate public school officials' need to conduct searches,
weighing that need against the rights of students to preserve their
privacy against invasive searches. Section VI reviews analogous invasive body search programs instituted in nonschool contexts. This
Note will conclude that invasive body searches should not be conducted in public schools without the added safeguard of individualized suspicion to protect students' fourth amendment rights.
II.

History and Application of the Fourth Amendment
to Public Schools

Prior to 1985, the United States Supreme Court had never decided
a case directly addressing the fourth amendment rights of public
school students. 28 In earlier decisions, the Court had considered the
rights of schoolchildren under the first, fifth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendments. 29 The Court clearly stated that students were "persons"
25. A "pat-down" can be defined as "a limited search of the [person's) outer
clothing .

. . ."

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (upholding "stop and frisk"

procedure to locate concealed weapons when police are investigating a person's
suspicious conduct).
26. For a discussion of student strip searches, see infra notes 194-210 and
accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of urinalysis testing, see infra notes 211-84 and accompanying text.
28. For this reason, New Jersey v. T.L.O. was a case of first impression in
the United States Supreme Court. See Margolick, Students and Privacy, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1985, at B4, col. 5.
29. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (first amendment bars
local school boards from censoring and removing books from school library); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (first
amendment protects students' right to wear armbands as passive protest against
United States policy in Vietnam); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) (fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applies in juvenile delinquency proceedings); see also
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment
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whose fundamental rights must be respected under the United States
Constitution. ° It follows that students in public schools should be
entitled to other basic protections afforded to "people" by the Bill
of Rights, especially the fourth amendment right of "the people"

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.3
For the most part, juveniles outside the school environment enjoy
the same fourth amendment protections as do adults, '2 and yet the

question remains whether characteristics unique to the school environment effectively reduce students to the status of second-class

citizens for fourth amendment purposes. The Supreme Court has
stated that the primary purpose of the fourth amendment was to
protect the individual from "arbitrary and oppressive official
conduct" 3 3 because "[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the
in schools); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (fifth amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy precludes criminal prosecution of juvenile after commencement of juvenile court adjudication involving the offense); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (fourteenth amendment due process clause prohibits suspension
of public school students without notice and hearing); cf. Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 322, 326 (1975) (public high school students have substantive and
procedural rights while at school, and school board officials who "knowingly" or
"unknowingly" violate these rights may be held liable for their actions); Gallegos
v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962) (fifth amendment prohibition against double
jeopardy bars criminal prosecution of juveniles after juvenile court reaches adjudication concerning same offense).
30. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (holding that "lilt can hardly be argued that ... students ... shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate").
The Court emphasized that- "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate" and "[students] may not
be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved."
Id. at 511.
However, courts have held that the rights of minors may be legitimately curtailed
when the restriction at issue served the state's interest in promoting the health and
welfare of juveniles. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483,
488-89, 315 N.E.2d 466, 468, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407 (1974); see also infra note
109 (discussion of the state's parens patriae responsibility for welfare of juveniles).
31. See Abdullah B. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 838, 843, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 784 (1982) (holding that juveniles have fourth amendment rights); see also
Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IOWA L. REv. 739, 742-43 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Buss, The Fourth Amendment].
32. See S. DAvis, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM § 3.6
(2d ed. 1985) (reviewing various approaches taken by lower federal and state courts
applying fourth amendment in juvenile proceedings) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs,
RIGHTS OF JuvENu.Es]. A number of states have statutes which afford to juveniles
the identical fourth amendment protection enjoyed by adults. See, e.g., UNrI.
JUVENILE COURT ACT

§ 27(b) (1968); Levitt, Preadjudicatory Confessions and

Consent Searches: Placing the Juvenile on the Same Constitutional Footing as an
Adult, 57 B.U.L. REv. 778, 781 n.24 (1977).
33. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 7, at 9. The fourth amendment
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first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
4
3

government."
Although the fourth amendment was designed to protect citizens

from unreasonable searches by federal government officials, in Mapp
v. Ohio," the Supreme Court ruled that any right to privacy en-

forceable against the federal government under the fourth amendment
was also enforceable against state action under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.36 As a result, evidence obtained from
a search violating the fourth amendment would be subject to exclusion in state courts 37 as well as in federal courts.3" This "exclusionary rule"3 9 has been the principal method of ensuring that the

was intended to protect the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life"
from generalized searches by persons with unchecked authority. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (compulsory production of person's private papers
to be used in evidence against him violates fourth and fifth amendments).
34. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(evidence seized from search conducted on probable cause consisting of an officer's
personal observations of petitioner's prior illegal activity admissible at trial); see
also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusions by the police-which is at the core of the-Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of
ordered liberty'."). The fourth amendment stands for "the principle that a man's
home is his castle which is not to be invaded by any 'general authority' to search

and seize." 1
Supp. 1981).

WHARJTON's CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

312 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1974 &

35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally I LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra
note 3, § 1.1(e).
36. 367 U.S. at 654-55. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... " U.S. CoNST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
37. 367 U.S. at 655. The Mapp decision overruled a prior Supreme Court case
which had held that although all evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search
or seizure was inadmissible in a federal court, "in a prosecution in a State court
for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
38. "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it
is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against
the Federal Government." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
39. The exclusionary rule represents a "judicially created means of effectuating
the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
482 (1976) (state prisoner cannot ordinarily obtain habeas corpus relief in federal
court on fourth amendment grounds). In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976), the Supreme Court asserted that the " 'prime purpose' of the rule, if not
the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.' " Id. at 446 (holding
this purpose would not be served by using exclusionary rule to bar evidence obtained
by state law enforcement officer from federal civil tax proceedings).
An analysis of the exclusionary rule is outside the scope of this Note. However,
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constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
does not become a mere "form of words." 4
The fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and
seizures; other types of searches are not affected. 4 ' The first inquiry
is whether a "search" or "seizure" occurred to trigger the protection
of the fourth amendment.4 2 The word "seizure" has been defined
as the act of taking possession of real or personal property by
removing it from the actual or constructive possession of another
person.4 3 More recently, the Supreme Court stated that a "seizure"
occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in [the] property."" As to a "seizure"
of a person, courts have held that full-fledged arrests,'" "investigatory
the United States Supreme Court originally granted certiorari in 1984 in New Jersey
v. T.L.O. to decide the issue of whether the exclusionary rule would apply to bar
evidence unlawfully obtained in a school search. 105 S.Ct. at 738. Since the Court
ultimately decided that the search in question did not violate the fourth amendment,
the exclusionary rule issue was never addressed. Id. at 738-39. Several lower courts
have applied the exclusionary rule to bar the fruits of unlawful school searches
from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., Gordon J.v. Santa
Ana Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App. 3d 530, 542, 544, 208 Cal. Rptr. 657,
665, 666 (1984) (exclusionary rule applies to bar evidence from juvenile court
proceedings but not from high school disciplinary proceedings); State v. Mora, 307
So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated for determination of whether decision was based on state
or federal constitution, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), modified, 330 So. 2d 990 (La.)
(discussed infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004
(1976).
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). A number of courts recognize that
"[e]vidence unconstitutionally obtained is excluded in both state and federal courts
as an essential to due process-not as a rule of evidence but as a matter of constitutional law." State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 306, 163 S.E.2d 376, 384 (1968) (voluntary invitation to law enforcement officers to search premises and person constitutes
waiver of fourth amendment rights).
41. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (discussed infra notes 96, 11516 and accompanying text); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960);
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 4i, 46 (1933).
42. If there was no "search" or "seizure," fourth amendment requirements do
not apply. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REv. 349, 388 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment]; I LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 3, at 221-22; HALL,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 7, at 10.
43. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (5th ed. 1979).
44. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (government agents asserted
dominion and control over package which had been in custody of private freight
carrier). Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (mere transfer of
container holding unmonitored electronic tracking device held not to be a "seizure")
with Maryland v. Macon, 105 S.Ct. 2778 (1985) (act of undercover agent purchasing
obscene magazines in store held not a "seizure" because seller's possessory interest
transferred to buyer at the time money was exchanged for magazines).
45. See Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) (use of deadly force in
apprehending criminal suspect constitutes a "seizure" under fourth amendment).
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or a "detention of the [person] against his will'"'

qualify."8

A "search" involves an intrusion into a hidden place as part of
a quest for contraband, or for illicit or stolen property 9 that occurs
"when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed." 50 If the search invades a reasonable expectation of privacy, the next step is to ascertain whether the search

satisfies fourth amendment requirements; if it does not, the search
will be deemed unreasonable."' To determine the reasonableness of
a search, the governmental interest in conducting the search must
be balanced against the individual's right to be free from unwanted
52
intrusions.
Traditionally, leading authorities agreed that the fourth amendment
'reasonableness" standard derived its meaning from the warrant

clause.

3

The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States5 4 stated that

46. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (fingerprints obtained
during dragnet police detention procedure without probable cause held inadmissible
in evidence).
47. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (fingernail samples taken to
preserve "highly evanescent evidence" upon probable cause held not to violate
fourth and fourteenth amendments).
48. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (seizure occurs "whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"). Compare
United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir. 1982) (implicit constraints on
a person's freedom constitute a "seizure") with United States v. Ramirez-Cifuentes,
682 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1982) (disagreeing).
49. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1211 (5th ed. 1979); see also Beck v. Ohio,

379 U.S. 89, 93-95 (1964) (warrantless search of criminal suspect arrested on probable
cause held unconstitutional); State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (demand to disclose or produce concealed object treated as "search"),
cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1980); Case v. State, 624 S.W.2d 348, 350
(Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (police officer's observation of movie-viewing booth occupants
in adult theater held to be "search").
50. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also State v.
Ragsdale, 381 So. 2d 492, 497 (La. 1980); Macias v. State, 649 S.W.2d 150, 15152 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (taking a urine sample constitutes "search" and "seizure"
under fourth amendment).
51. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 42, at
388; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (balancing test applied
to warrantless vehicle searches); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 27 (1968); infra
notes 96, 115-16 and accompanying text; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 530-31 (1967) (warrantless administrative searches held reasonable when balanced
against individual rights).
52. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (cited with approval in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733, 743-44 (1985)).
53. The language of the fourth amendment does not indicate any relationship
between the two clauses. It has been suggested that the two clauses were written
for separate purposes: historically, the first clause was interpreted to provide general
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, while the second clause
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a search conducted without a validly obtained search warrant was
per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment." This general rule

itemized the requirements for obtaining search warrants. See N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FoUrTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 100 (1937). There are three possible interpretations of the
relationship between the two clauses:
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant requirements specified in the second clause; (2) that the first clause provides
an additional restriction by implying that some searches may be "unreasonable" and therefore not permissible, even when made under warrant; or (3) that the first clause provides an additional search power
authorizing the judiciary to find some searches "reasonable" even when
carried out without a warrant.
J. LANDYNSKI,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42 (Johns Hopkins

University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LXXXIV, 1966) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as LANDYNSKI]. Legal scholars generally agree
that although the first two of these possible interpretations are faithful to the
original understanding of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court today tends
to adhere to the third interpretation. See LANDYNSKI, supra, at 43; Wasserstrom,
The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257, 281-82
(1984).
54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (discussed supra note 9). A valid search warrant must
be issued by a judge or magistrate upon probable cause. Id. at 357. For a definition
of probable cause, see infra notes 55, 73. See also 1 RiNGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.4 (1985) (tracing the historical development of the
per se unreasonable rule for warrantless searches) [hereinafter cited as RiNGEL,
SEARCHES AND SEIZUREs]; HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 7, § 1.3 (same);
Buss, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 31, at 743 (stating that searches conducted
without warrants are presumptively unreasonable).
55. See State v. Thornton, 414 A.2d 229, 233 (Me. 1980) (defining probable
cause necessary to obtain search warrant); Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560,
569-70, 350 A.2d 173, 180 (1976) (same); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
235 (1983) (" 'only the probability, and not a prima facie showing of criminal
activity is the standard of probable cause' ") (quoting Spinelli v. United States,
399 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)); In re Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas, 593 F.
Supp. 184, 189 (S.D. W. Va. 1984) (identical requirements of probable cause
necessary for issuance of search warrant); Waters v. State, 357 So. 2d 368, 371
(Ala. Crim. App.) (probable cause for issuance of a warrant "is grounded on
practical factual considerations of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent
men act," not legal technicalities), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 273 (1978); Yocham
v. State, 165 Ga. App. 650, 652, 302 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1983) (probable cause for
issuance of search warrant "means less than certainty but more than mere suspicion
or possibility"-mere speculation, rumor or opinion is not enough); State v. Abraham, 218 Neb. 475, 478, 356 N.W.2d 877, 879 (1984) (probable cause to support
issuance of search warrant is reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts).
Many different fact situations give rise to probable cause. See, e.g., United
States v. Repetti, 364 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1966) (reliability of government informant
plus detail and accuracy of information provided constitutes probable cause); State
v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz. 46, 402 P.2d 1 (1965) (en banc) (confession constitutes
probable cause for issuance of search warrant), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1022 (1966);
State v. Craver, 70 N.C. App. 555, 558, 320 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1984) (probable
cause to issue search warrant satisfied when applicant shows reason to believe illegal
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was subject to a "few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." '5 6 Of these exceptions, the Court has recognized only
five that waive the warrant requirement: searches made under exigent
circumstances" where the police are in "hot pursuit; '" s pursuant to
a "stop and frisk" for weapons;5 9 where the evidence is in plain
view; 60 or with the consent of the individual whose person or property
activity exists in specified place to be searched); cf. People v. Montanaro, 34 Misc.
2d 624, 626, 229 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681 (Kings County Ct. 1962) (to obtain search
warrant, applicant must have probable cause to believe specified property will be
found on specific premises; whereas to obtain arrest warrant, there must be probable
cause that specific persons committed specific crimes).
56. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Fourth amendment warrant
and probable cause requirements have also been relaxed for searches conducted in
special or unique settings. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (administrative
inspection of regulated business); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(same); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (same); see also
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (aboard vessels within
United States or its coastal waters); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619
(1977) (border searches of persons or packages); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973) (searches at national borders); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982) (automobile searches).
57. "Exigent circumstances" are those circumstances sufficient to excuse an
officer from the requirement of obtaining a warrant to conduct a search
for which he has probable cause. Such circumstances include time pressures,
the emergency nature of the situation, and the potential danger of the
situation which makes obtaining a warrant impossible or ill-advised in light
of the urgent need for immediate action.
1 RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, supra note 54, § 10.1. See generally 1 RINGEL,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, supra note 54, §§ 10.1-10.5 (background and development
of doctrine of exigent circumstances); HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 7,
ch. 7 (exigent circumstances).
58. For leading cases discussing the warrant exception for hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en
banc); State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1979). See generally 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, supra note 3, § 6.1(e); 1 RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, supra note
54, § 10.5(b); HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 7, §§ 7.6-9.
59. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (discussed supra notes 96, 115-16);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (companion case). For a discussion of
how courts address the issue of police encounters with and detention of suspects,
see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 3, ch. 9; 1 RINGEL, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES, supra note 54, §§ 13.1-10; HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note
7, §§ 10.1-38.
60. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Supreme Court
established three requirements for a valid plain view and seizure of evidence: (1)
the officer must have had a prior justification for his intrusion of the suspect's privacy;
(2) the evidence seized must have been discovered inadvertently; and (3) the seizing
officer must immediately be aware of the evidentiary value of what was found. See
id. at 466-70. For a general discussion of the "plain view" doctrine, see 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 3, § 7.5; 1 RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
supra note 54, § 13.8; HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 7, §§ 3.9-16.
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is searched. 6' In addition, even in the
exception of consent, the Court has
mental inquiry in considering Fourth
or not a search or seizure is reasonable
III.

above five instances, with the
emphasized that the "fundaAmendment issues is whether
under all the circumstances."62

New Jersey v. T.L.O.

In its 1985 decision, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 63 the Supreme Court
extended the proposition that the reasonableness of a search should
be evaluated in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances
61. Consent by a suspect to a search effectively waives fourth amendment
requirements of a search warrant and the necessity for probable cause. Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (by consenting to vehicle search, occupants
of vehicle stopped by police for traffic violations effectively waived their fourth
amendment rights when the search yielded evidence used for prosecution). The two
issues to be addressed in a potential consent search case are: (1) whether the consent
was voluntarily given in light of the totality of the circumstances; and (2) whether
the person consenting to the search has the authority to do so. See 1 RINGEL,
SEARCHES A.ND SEIZURES, supra note 54, §§ 9.1-7 (consent searches); HALL, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, supra note 7, §§ 4.1-46 (same).
62. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (emphasis added). This
"overall reasonableness" might ultimately set limitations on law enforcement officers' power to search in instances when a court determines that despite the presence
of a valid search warrant, the search at issue was unreasonable. See, e.g., United
States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (major intrusions, such as surgery,
may not be conducted without a prior adversary proceeding with appellate review
on the issuance of the warrant), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
63. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). For prior case history, see State ex. rel. T.L.O., 94
N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983); State ex. rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448
A.2d 493 (1982); State ex. rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 (1980).
See also Note, School Officials May Conduct Student Searches Upon Satisfaction
of Reasonableness Test in Order to Maintain Educational Environment-In re
T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983), 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 738 (1984)
(Note completed before certiorari was granted by United States Supreme Court).
For discussion and analysis of the Supreme Court decision, see Greenhouse, High
Court Eases Search Strictures in Public Schools, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1985, at
Al, col. 5; Narvaez, Principal Extols Searches Decision, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
1985, at A16, col. 1; Margolick, Students and Privacy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985,
at B4, col. 5; Hogan & Schwartz, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools,
7 WHITTIER L. REv. 527 (1985); Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme
Court's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 933 (1985); Rosenberg,
New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Of Children and Smokescreens, 19 FAMILY L.Q. 311 (1985);
Stewart, And in Her Purse the Principal Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J. 51 (1985);
Note, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Fourth Amendment Goes to School, 19 J. MAR.
L. REv. 115 (1985); Note, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court Severely Limits
Schoolchildrens' Fourth Amendment Rights When Being Searched by School Officials, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 87 (1985); Comment, Drug Urinalysis in the Public
Schools: Going Beyond T.L.O., 18 AKRON L. REv. 709 (1985); Comment, New Jersey
v. T.L.O.: Closing the Schoolhouse Gate on the Fourth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U.
REv. L. Soc. CHANGE 455 (1986); Comment, Privacy Penumbra Encompasses Students
in School Searches [New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985)], 25 WASHBURN
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to the school context." A high school teacher found T.L.O. and

another student smoking cigarettes in a restroom in violation of
school rules and escorted the two girls to see Assistant Vice-Principal
Choplick. 65 After T.L.O. denied that she smoked at all, Choplick
demanded to see her purse, opened it, and found a pack of cigarettes

inside.6 As Choplick removed the cigarettes, he noticed a package
of cigarette rolling papers-commonly associated, in his experience,
with the use of marijuana.6 7 Choplick then decided to search the
bag thoroughly. 68 He found some marijuana, a pipe, several empty

plastic bags, $40.98 in small bills, and letters implicating T.L.O. in
69

drug dealing.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court
judgment, concluded that Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse did
not violate the fourth amendment. 70 The Court held that the fourth
amendment applied to searches conducted by school personnel, 7' but
that "the school setting require[d] some easing of the restrictions
to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.' '72 As
a result, the focal point in this and future school search cases would
'7
be a "standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause. '

L.J. 135 (1985); Comment, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Finding a Reasonable Standard
for Searches in Public Schools, 12 W. ST. U.L. REv. 873 (1985).
64. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743-44 (1985).
65. Id. at 736-37.
66. Id. at 737.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 739.
71. Id. at 739-40.
72. Id. at 743. The Court formally dismissed the traditional fourth amendment
requirement for a search warrant in school searches. Id.
73. Id. Probable cause for a search can be defined as:
[A] flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts
available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief" . . . that certain items may be contraband or stolen property
or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that
such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A "practical,
nontechnical" probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all
that is required.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (citations omitted) (holding evidence
seized in plain view from validly stopped vehicle admissible because officer performed
lawful inspection of front seat area); see also Iverson v. State, 480 F.2d 414, 418
(8th Cir. 1973); United States ex. rel. Eidenmuller v. Fay, 240 F. Supp. 591, 594,
595 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 964 (1965); Buss, The Fourth Amendment,
supra note 31, at 744 (" 'probable cause' attempts to articulate an evidentiary
standard that does not permit obtaining a warrant to be casual or automatic, but
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A reasonableness standard balances the government's interest in
conducting a search against the schoolchild's interest in preventing
an invasion of his privacy."' While the Court accepted that the maintenance of order is necessary in schools, the Court stated that "the
situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no
legitimate expectations of privacy."" The Court further acknowledged that an invasion of privacy is greatest where, as here, the
76
search is of the person or belongings carried on the person.
A. Application of T.L.O. to School Search Law
Prior to T.L.O., lower federal and state courts often circumvented
strict applications of the fourth amendment which would have invalidated school searches. 7 These courts seemed unwilling to deprive
school officials of their authority to enforce school rules, especially
when serious threats to school safety, such as drugs or weapons,
were involved .7
Some courts used the approach taken in In re Donaldson,'79 which
held that while the fourth and fourteenth amendments restrained
government or state action, school principals acted as private citizens
and not as government officials or state agents. s° Adherents of the

at the same time is not so high that warrants become virtually unobtainable").
74. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743. Many lower federal and state courts applied
the fourth amendment to school searches but allowed school officials to invade
students' privacy rights upon less than probable cause. See Comment, Privacy
Penumbra Encompasses Students in School Searches, 25 WAsI-IRU.N L.J. 135,
143 n.61 (1985).
75. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 742.
76. Id. at 741-42.
77. See id. at 738-39 n.2 (citing decisions based upon "private citizen" theory,
discussed supra notes 79-83, or in loco parentis doctrine, discussed supra notes 91-92).
78. See id.
79. 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (school officials who
searched student's locker did not act as government officials for fourth amendment
purposes); see also A.B.C., Alleged Delinquent, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 115 (1970)
(same holding).
80. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 221. As a result, fourth amendment
prohibitions would not apply to searches and seizures conducted by school officials.
Id.; see D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982) (school personnel held
not to be "law enforcement officers," consequently their search of a student for
stolen money did not violate state or federal constitutional limitations); In re Thomas
G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (same holding in search of
student's person for pills); In re J.A., 85 111. App. 3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980)
(holding that school disciplinary officer, also a part-time juvenile police officer,
was not acting as police officer at the time he searched student's coat); People v.
Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (when police
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private citizen theory drew support from an earlier Supreme Court
decision which held that the fourth amendment does not protect an
individual against searches and seizures conducted by private citizens
not acting as government agents. 8' However, if school officials did
not act alone but acted together with law enforcement personnel,
the search lost its private character and became a search conducted
pursuant to governmental authority, and therefore, was subject to
the probable cause and warrant requirements of the fourth amendment .82
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court eliminated the distinction between
a private citizen and a state agent, holding that school personnel
conducting searches act as state agents for fourth amendment purposes.8 3 The Court left open the standard that would apply to

were not involved, school official held equivalent to a private person); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974) (same holding in
search of student's person for pills). But see People v. Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d 697,
356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1974) (school security officer at whose
request student emptied manilla envelope which contained marijuana, held not equivalent to a teacher, so he could only premise search upon probable cause); M.J. v. State,
399 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. App. 1981) (holding "where a law enforcement officer
directs, participates, or acquiesces in a search conducted by school officials, the
officer must have probable cause for that search"); infra note 83 and accompanying
text.
Courts have employed different approaches to find that a sufficient nexus exists
between school officials conducting student searches and the state to classify school
officials as state agents for fourth amendment purposes. See Bellnier v. Lund, 438
F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971);
People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); In re G.C., 121 N.J.
Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (1972); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (1975);
People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); People v. Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P.2d 113 (1974). For a general discussion of
whether courts treated school officials as government agents or private citizens prior
to the T.L.O. decision, see Comment, Search and Seizure: Is the School Official
a Policeman or Parent?, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 554, 556-57 (1970); Note, Public School
Searches and Seizures, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 202, 209-15 (1976); Note, Students and
the Fourth Amendment: Myth or Reality?, 46 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 282 (1977).
81. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (fourth amendment
intended to restrain "sovereign authority" and "not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies").
82. See, e.g., M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill. 1977)
(upholding student search by school officials when no police involvement); Picha
v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (police involvement in school
search increases degree of justification needed to conduct search). But see Doe v.
Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, remanded in part on
other grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1022 (1982) (school search did not lose private character because police participation
was at invitation of school personnel, and prior agreement had been reached stating
that no arrests were to be made if drugs were found).
83. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741 (1985). The majority of lower

19861

PUBLIC SCHOOL DRUG SEARCHES

searches "by other public authorities acting at the request of school
officials. "84 This raises the possibility that police participation in a
school search might still call for strict satisfaction of the probable
cause and warrant requirements of the fourth amendment.8 5
At least one state court has gone further by holding that school
personnel are state agents subject to identical fourth amendment
strictures as law enforcement officers in the criminal process.8 6 In

federal and state courts similarly concluded that searches of students by school
employees constitute governmental action and are subject to the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d
588 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp.
223 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26 (D. Or. 1979); Doe v.
Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, remanded in part,
631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438
F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill.
1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill.
1976); Smyth v. Lubbers,
398 F. Supp. 777, 787 (W.D. Mich. 1975); United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp.
99 (N.D. Me. 1969); In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1972); In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973);
State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. F.W.E., 360 So. 2d
148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); In re J.A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N.E.2d
958 (1980); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975),
on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976); People v.
Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347,
540 P.2d 827 (1975); People v. Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 310, 333 N.E.2d 369, 372
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1975); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 1st Dep't 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167
(1972); State v. Wingerd, 40 Ohio App. 2d 236, 318 N.E.2d 866 (1974); State v.
Walker, 19 Or. App. 420, 528 P.2d 113 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75,
558 P.2d 781 (1977); In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979). But see
D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (school officials not
deemed government agents for fourth amendment purposes); In re Donaldson, 269
Cal. App.2d 509, 511-12, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221-22 (1969) (same proposition);
Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 384, 323 A.2d 145, 147 (1974)
(same); R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
84. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733, 741 n.5.
85. See State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S.E.2d 586, 594, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1039 (1975); M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill.
1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (N.D. Il1. 1976); In re Guillermo
M., 130 Cal. App. 3d 642, 181 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1982) (school security agent acted
properly in stopping and conducting pat down search of student to find weapons);
cf. Martens v. District No. 220 Bd. of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Ill.
1985)
(holding student's fourth amendment rights were not violated when he was detained
and convinced by deputy sheriff to empty his pockets based upon reasonable
suspicion that he possessed narcotics).
86. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on
remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
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State v. Mora, the court expressly applied a probable cause standard
to school searches,8 7 and the exclusionary rule to bar the fruits of
unlawful school searches from criminal trials and juvenile delinquency
proceedings."8
After T.L.O., in which the Supreme Court established that a lower
standard of reasonableness would govern school searches, that portion of the Mora decision adopting the probable cause standard may
be inconsistent. However, Mora may survive T.L.O. because the
more stringent requirements adopted by the Louisiana court were
based in part on state law. 9 If a state court bases its judgment on
state statutory or constitutional law, which requires a higher standard
than the standard demanded by the United States Constitution, its
judgment rests on adequate and independent state grounds and is
immune from review by the United States Supreme Court. 90
In Mercer v. State,9' a Texas Court of Civil Appeals employed
an alternative theory to exempt a school search from fourth amend87. Id., 330 So. 2d at 901.
88. See id. at 904-05 (Summers, J., dissenting). Although the Mora court
expressly adopted the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court in T.L.O. later left
open the question of whether illegally seized evidence from a school search would
be admissible in court. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 739 n.3.
89, Mora, 330 So. 2d at 901-02; see also DAVIs, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra
note 32, § 3.7(a).
90. DAvIs, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 32, § 3.7(a). A majority of the
Supreme Court supported this view, stating that "[olf course, New Jersey may
insist on a more demanding standard under its own Constitution or statutes. In
that case, its courts would not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment
when they invalidate a search." 105 S. Ct. at 745 n.10 (1985). Pennsylvania courts
have generally sought to apply the fourth amendment in a more expansive manner
than do the federal courts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 4344, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); Commonwealth
v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 219 n.2, 239 A.2d 290, 292 n.2 (1968) (state has power
to impose higher standards for searches and seizures than standards imposed by
federal courts).
91. 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (high school principal who demanded
that student empty his pockets acted in loco parents, not as state agent, and
marijuana discovered by this search did not violate student's fourth amendment
rights); see also In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972);
M.J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. App. 1981) (school officials who acted alone
were treated as state agents subject to lower constitutional standard for conducting
searches than probable cause due to doctrine of in loco parentis); People v. Jackson,
65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1971), qff'd, 30 N.Y.2d
734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 133 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972) (high school discipline coordinator
possessing reasonable suspicion that student had narcotics on his person was entitled
to search and seize the drugs under in loco parentis doctrine); R.C.M. v. State,
660 S.W.2d 552, 553-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (vice-principal and security guard
acted in loco parentis when searching a juvenile). Compare D.R.C. v. State, 646
P.2d 252, 260 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (teacher and assistant principal who searched
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ments requirements. The court upheld school officials' authority to
conduct searches upon a lower standard of suspicion than probable
cause based upon the doctrine of in loco parentis.9 2 The in loco
parentis doctrine asserts that although fourth amendment restrictions
may apply to state agents, school personnel act as agents of the
students' parents. As a result, school officials would be considered
private persons for fourth amendment purposes, 93 school searches
could be conducted without a warrant or probable cause, and evidence obtained from a search could be used in subsequent judicial
proceedings.
The Supreme Court has since rejected the in loco parentis doctrine
because it conflicted "with contemporary reality and the teachings
of this Court." 94 However, since T.L.O. established a reasonable
suspicion standard for school searches, instead of a higher probable
cause standard, earlier lower court decisions using the in loco parentis
doctrine to uphold school searches based upon a standard lower
than probable cause, in effect remain good law."
B.

The T.L.O. Two Prong Balancing Test

The T.L.O. Court established a test to determine the overall reasonableness of a school search. The first prong of the
test inquires " 'whether the ... action was justified at its inception.' " Generally, the search is justified if the teacher or school
students acted merely within the scope of their employment, not as government
agents seeking criminal activity-therefore no fourth amendment restrictions applied)
with People v. Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't
1974) (high school security officer who searched a student held not within ambit
of in loco parentis, so he could only premise his search upon probable cause and
not reasonable suspicion).
92. In loco parentis literally means "in the place of a parent." BLACK'S LAW
DiCTiONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979). The in loco parentis doctrine at common law was
employed to delegate to school authorities supervisory duties which parents presumably exercised in disciplining and correcting their children. See I BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *453. Many jurisdictions have applied the in loco parentis doctrine
to permit school authorities acting on reasonable suspicion to search students and
to seize dangerous instrumentalities and narcotics. See In re Donaldson, 269
Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); In re Thomas G., 11 Cal. App. 3d
193,,90 Cal. Rptr.-361 (1970); State v.. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971);
In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (1972); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc.
.2d 601,' 313 N.Y.S2d 253 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970); R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d
552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
93. See supra note. 80,and accompanying text.
94. T.L.O., 105,S.'Ct. 733, 741 (1985).
95. 1 RINGEL, SEARCES AND SEIZURES, supra note 54, § 17.2(a).
96. T.L.O., 105.S. Ct. at 744 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
Although the' T.L.O." Court expressly adopted a test from Terry to clarify the

• ", ./'a* , "' "
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official had reasonable grounds to suspect that a search would
produce evidence tending to show that the student violated either
a law or a school rule.9" The conduct of the assistant vice-principal
in T.L.O. satisfied this prong of the test because a teacher's report
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. possessed cigarettes
and had been smoking in the school restroom. 9
The second prong of the T.L.O. test inquires "whether the search
as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' "9
This requirement is satisfied if "the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction."'00 The T.L.O. Court concluded that Mr. Choplick did
not act unreasonably in thoroughly searching T.L.O.'s purse after
meaning of "reasonable suspicion," the two cases differ significantly. In Terry, a
police officer observed two men who appeared to be "casing" a place before
committing a "stick-up." 392 U.S. at 6. The officer had no other information to
form "probable cause" for a belief that a crime was about to take place. 392
U.S. at 28. However, the Court created a narrow exception to the traditional need
for probable cause due to "the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence ....

."

392 U.S. at 24. The

Terry Court allowed the officer's act of conducting a "carefully limited search"
for weapons based upon the reasonable conclusion "in light of [the officer's]
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he
is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous ...." 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis

added). The officer "did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever
evidence of criminal activity he might find." Id.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has not stated that school searches must be
severely limited in scope, as is a "stop-and-frisk." See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
at 16 n.12, 17 n.13 (establishing legal scope of "stop-and-frisk" procedure). School
officials need only comply with a vague "reasonableness, under all the circumstances" standard, T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 743, which may allow students' privacy
to be invaded by intrusive searches for contraband based upon school officials' reasonable suspicion that would be illegal if undertaken by police officers without probable
cause. See infra notes 150-69 (discussing canine investigations of students' persons);
notes 194-210 (discussing strip searches of students); notes 211-27 (discussing drug
testing of students) and accompanying text. Justices Brennan and Marshall have
expressly stated that "[ilf the search in question is more than a minimally intrusive
Terry-stop, the constitutional probable-cause standard [should] determin[e] its
validity." T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 753 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
97. 105 S. Ct. at 744, 745. A majority of the Court stated that it has " 'repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States, and
of school officials consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
and control conduct in the schools.' " Id. at 744 n.9 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)).
98. 105 S.Ct. at 745-46.
99. Id. at 744 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
100. Id. at 744.

PUBLIC SCHOOL DRUG SEARCHES

19861

he discovered cigarette rolling papers and, therefore, his conduct
also satisfied the second prong of this test.' 0
In sum, the first prong of the T.L.O. balancing test assesses a
public school administrator's impetus and justification for conducting
student searches; while the second prong addresses the scope of the
search at issue, measuring the reasonableness or severity of the
intrusion upon students' privacy interests resulting from the search.
IV.

The Need to Conduct Student Searches

Public school authorities strive to exercise discipline over students
and simultaneously to preserve a type of environment conducive to
students' intellectual and social development. 0 2 The Supreme Court
underlined the importance of the educational process by stating that
Boards of Education may not violate the Bill of Rights when they
create school policies: 03 "[E]ducating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes."',4
Compulsory education laws force children to "associate with the
criminal few-or perhaps merely the immature and unwise fewclosely and daily."'0 5 In addition, these laws may impose an affirmative duty on school officials to provide a "safe and secure
environment"' ° by "investigat[ing] any charge that a student is using
or possessing narcotics and [by taking] appropriate steps, if the
charge is substantiated."'' 07 To fulfill this duty, school personnel

101. Id. at 746-47.
102. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (1982)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d
550, 709 P.2d 1287, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1985) (en banc); see also Brief for the
United States Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 7-8, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 3, at 458;
Buss, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 31, at 770-71; Rosenberg, New Jersey
v. T.L.O.: Of Children and Smokescreens, 19 FAm. L.Q. 311, 325 (1985).
103. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
104. Id.
105. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 496, 216 S.E.2d 586, 592, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1039 (1975) (search of high school student by school official who noticed
furtive movements by student did not violate his fourth amendment rights).
106. Id.
107. People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598, 283 N.Y.S.2d
22, 24-25 (1967); see also Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d
470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (society assumes a duty to protect students
"from dangers posed by anti-social activities-their own and those of other stu-
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school can be described as "a special kind of place in which serious
and dangerous wrongdoing is intolerable." ' 09 As a result, school
authorities' efforts to maintain an educational environment free from

drug and alcohol abuse'10 may deserve an extremely high degree of
judicial protection.

dents"), cert. denied, 463 U.S 1207 (1983); Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662,
670 (10th Cir. 1981) ("school authorities have, on behalf of the public, an interest
... and a duty to police the school"); In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d
777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (relied on school officials' duty to protect moral
condition of school and upheld their power to suspend one student for protection
of others); State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 640, 456 P.2d 1, 3 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 947 (1970) (emphasized importance of preserving the welfare of students'
persons); State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).
In a related case concerning a college dormitory search, the court's decision
relied in part on Overton and also on the importance of promoting an "environment
consistent with the educational process." Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy
State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968). For a related discussion of
school searches at the college/university level, see Note, Shall the Truce Be Unbroken? New Jersey v. T.L.O. and Higher Education, 12 J. CoLL. & UNIV. L.
415 (1985).
108. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Buss, The Fourth
Amendment, supra note 31, at 770; see also In re Robert B., 172 Cal. App. 3d
763, 218 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1985) (school security guards are permitted to exercise
more stringent regulation over schoolchildren than would be allowed over adults).
109. People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 486, 315 N.E.2d 466, 468, 358 N.Y.S.2d
403, 406 (1974); see also Fisher v. Burkburnett Indep. School Dist., 419 F. Supp.
1200 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (drug overdose at school). Society's interest in protecting
juveniles and preventing crime among juveniles stems from the state's parens patriae
interest in the welfare of children. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the
country" and refers traditionally to the state's role as guardian for persons under

a legal disability.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1003 (5th ed. 1979). Children, due to

their lack of legal capacity, are assumed to be subject to parental control. Id. If
parental control ceases, the state steps in, acting as parens patriae to promote the
child's welfare. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982); State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 580 (Me. 1979); People
ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518
(1976); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (juveniles are at
"a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence
and to psychological damage") (footnote omitted); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
635 (1979) ("minors often lack the experience, perspective and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them") (footnote omitted). But see
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (parens patriae is a "Latin phrase [which has)
proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of
juveniles from the constitutional scheme").
110. Drug abuse may be defined as "the consumption, without medical authorization, of medically useful drugs which have the capacity for altering mood
and behavior" or "the use, except for medical research, of mind-changing drugs
and substances having no legitimate medical application." P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE
OFFENDER AND THE LAW

92 (3d ed. 1984) (citing
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V.

Student Privacy Interests

"[R]ecognizing an important school interest in preventing harm
to and the distraction of students is the beginning, not the end of
analysis.""' An assumption underlying the T.L.O. decision is that
school officials would not have enough freedom to perform their
disciplinary duties if stringent fourth amendment requirements of
2
probable cause and search warrants applied to school searches."
However, by lifting these requirements, the T.L.O. Court erased the
obstacles which had prevented school officials from intruding on a
student's legitimate expectation of privacy, reasoning that "special
characteristics of elementary and secondary schools ... make it
unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections
granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting," and "[iln any
realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of the population generally."" 3
Two earlier Supreme Court decisions suggest an approach to the
issue of which intrusions upon a student's expectation of privacy
should be deemed reasonable."" In Terry v. Ohio,'" the Court authorized police officers to carry out a limited search for weapons
during an investigative stop, using a standard of less than probable
cause, and emphasized that "the scope of the particular intrusion,
in light of all the exigencies of the case, [should be made] a central
6
element in the analysis of reasonableness.""11
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

1 (5th ed. 1968)). "Teenagers typically take . . .

Sedative and tranquilizing drugs in combination with alcohol or other drugs. When
depressants are taken with alcohol, the intensity of intoxication increases and the
combination is potentially lethal." I W. THORNTON & J. DOERNER, DELINQUENCY
AND JUSTICE 296 (1982). Drug use patterns begin early, especially in the schools.
P. HAHN, Tn JUVENILE OFFENDER AND THE LAW, supra, at 92. A 1981 report
by police agencies responsible for a population of nearly 214,369,000 citizens stated

that 96,321 children under the age of 18 and 13,812 children under the age of 15
were arrested in drug-related incidents. Id. at 90. During the same time period,
the number of children under the age of 18 arrested for drunkenness was 37,748,
and 3,295 children under the age of 15 were arrested on similar grounds. Id. at
104; see also supra note 1 (student drug use statistics).
111. Buss, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 31, at 770.
112. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985); see supra note 83 and
accompanying text.

113. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 747 (Powell & O'Connor, JJ., concurring); see Buss,
The Fourth Amendment, supra note 31, at 769; see also Margolick, Students and
Privacy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at B4, col. 5.
114. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 42, at
390.
115. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(companion case).
116. 392 U.S. at 17, 18 n.15.
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In Schmerber v. California,"7 the Court stated that searches which
breach the body wall, such as blood extraction, intrude more upon

the "interests in human dignity and privacy"118 than do external
body searches, and consequently require greater justification. Taken
"[tiogether, Terry and Schmerber might support a general fourth
amendment theory that increasing degrees of intrusiveness require
increasing degrees of justification and increasingly stringent procedures for the establishment of that justification.""19 This sliding scale

approach reasons that a search of a student's person or body cavity
raises more severe fourth amendment questions than does a search
of a student's locker. 20 By extension, the definition of a "reasonable"
search should vary in proportion to the ascending severity of the in-

trusion upon a student's legitimate expectation of privacy.' 2'
A.

Locker Searches
In general, courts have upheld the right of school authorities to

search student lockers.122 One theory exempts lockers from the ambit
123
of fourth amendment protection because they are school property;
117. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
118. Id. at 769-70.
119. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 42, at 390
(footnote omitted).
120. See Buss, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 31, at 773.
121. See, e.g., M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussed infra
notes 202-03 and accompanying text); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 488,
315 N.E.2d 466, 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407 (1974) (finding a higher expectation
of privacy in a student's person). See generally Trosch, Williams & DeVore, Public
School Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 11 J. L. & EDUC. 41, 50-52 (discussing
the sliding scale theory); Comment, Students and the Fourth Amendment: "The
Torturable Class", 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 709, 718-20 (1983) (distinguishing between
student's expectation of privacy in purse, school locker, and student's car parked
in school lot).
122. See Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981) (student and school
jointly owned lockers, therefore school officials are permitted to search lockers for
disciplinary reasons); cf. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 677 F.2d
471, 479 n.21 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (discussing validity of students' expectations of privacy in school lockers), op. replaced, 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also infra notes 123-27 and accompanying
text (discussing ownership of school lockers).
123. This theory presumes that ownership of the locker would enable the student
to have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding its contents. 1 RINGEL,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, supra note 54, § 17.2(c). However, in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), discussed supra note 9, the Supreme Court stated that
ownership was not a valid prerequisite to a reasonable expectation of privacy, since
what the student "seeks to preserve as [a] private [place], even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 389 U.S. at 351-52. "A search
has taken place if that reasonable expectation of privacy ha[s] been invaded,
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thus, a student would retain no legitimate expectation of privacy in
his locker space. 2 4 At best, courts have recognized that a student's
possession of his locker is exclusive only in relation to other stu25
dents. ,
School officials exercise dominion and control over their proprietary interest in lockers by issuing locks or combinations while
retaining master keys and lists of allotted combinations, by being
responsible for the general maintenance of student lockers, and by
issuing rules and regulations concerning what is and is not permissible
for students to store in their lockers. 126 As a result, even if a student
regardless of technical ownership of the property." O'Hara, Search and Seizure
Analysis in School Settings, 13 EDUC. L. RPTR. 1, 5 n.12 (1983).
124. Courts do not agree on this theory. See supra note 122. As a matter of
policy, a student could argue that he has a "strong interest" in the privacy of his
locker because "his personal freedom and privacy are already restricted by compulsory attendance laws and the resulting structure and regulation of in-school life"
so that "his locker is one of his few harbors of privacy within the school." Buss,
The Fourth Amendment, supra note 31, at 772-73; 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 31, at 463. Another relevant consideration may be whether school
authorities explicitly stated in a student handbook the school policy that "possession"
of a school locker is not exclusive. "This is not to suggest that [students] may be
deprived of [their] Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy by a government
announcement that the expectation [of privacy in the locker] will not be honored,
for this is quite clearly not the case." 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note
3, at 463. However, advance notice may provide the student with the chance to
limit the scope of an intrusion by not storing his personal items in his school
locker: "when the balance between privacy and law enforcement interests is extremely
close, a regulation giving the student advance notice of a possible search may tend
to swing the balance away from the student's interest in privacy." Buss, The Fourth
Amendment, supra note 31, at 765; see also Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist.,
499 F. Supp. 223, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1980) ("[tlhe mere announcement by officials
that individual rights are about to be infringed upon cannot justify the subsequent
infringement").
125. See In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 512, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 22223 (1969) (alternative basis for holding); State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d
1, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1969) (student's locker did not carry the exclusive
right of possession inherent in a dwelling, automobile or private locker); People
v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1967);
Overton v. Rieger, 311 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In sum:
Although a student may have control of his school locker as against
fellow students, his possession is not exclusive against the school and its
officials. A school does not supply its students with lockers for illicit
use in harboring pilfered property or harmful substances. We deem it
a proper function of school authorities to inspect the lockers under their
control and to prevent their use in illicit ways or for illegal purposes.
State v. Stein, 203 Kan. at 640, 456 P.2d at 3.
126. See, e.g., People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598,
283 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1967) (no expectation of privacy in school locker where school
officials maintained extensive control); A.B.C., Alleged Delinquent, 50 Pa. D. &
C.2d 115, 118 (1970); Comment, Searches by Drug Detection Dogs in Pennsylvania
Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 85 DICK. L. REv. 143, 147-49 (1980).
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subjectively believes his locker to be a private area, the student's
knowledge that school officials possess a master key makes this
expectation unreasonable. 2 '
School administrators typically can conduct locker searches in
accordance with school policy in response to bomb threats 128 or when
contraband is suspected of being hidden there. 129 A majority of
courts reason that school authorities have the right and possibly the
affirmative duty to inspect student lockers for disciplinary purposes. 30

In order to preserve a student's minimal privacy interest, most courts
allow locker searches to be conducted based upon a reasonable
suspicion that contraband will be discovered. '
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court considered only a search of a
student's purse and expressly refused to set a standard governing
searches of school lockers or desks. 32 The Court did not make a
In addition, courts support this conclusion by examining analogous cases involving
searches of lockers in public buildings other than schools. See, e.g., United States
v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217, 1219-21 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975)
(postal employee's acceptance of locker constituted consent to searches authorized
by government regulations); Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997, 1002-03 (C.D. Cal.
1972) (deputy sheriff's locker deemed government property and therefore was subject
to search), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Donato, 269 F.
Supp. 921, 923-24 (E.D. Pa.) (locker at U.S. mint subject to regular inspection,
so that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed), aff'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir.
1967); cf. United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1977) (search of police
officer's locker at station house held invalid because officer had a legitimate
expectation of privacy, lock was his own, and department had not promulgated
any rules regarding use or inspection of lockers); Tucker v. Superior Court, 84
Cal. App. 3d 43, 48, 148 Cal. Rptr. 167, 169 (1978) (restaurant employee retained
reasonable expectation of privacy in unlocked locker provided for his use by
employer).
127. See supra note 126,
128. See State v, Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 640, 456 P.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 397
U.S. 947 (1969); 1 RiNGEL, SEARCHES AND SHIzuREs, supra note 54, § 17.2(c).
129. See, e.g., State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985) (upholding
search of jacket inside student's locker when school official had reasonable grounds
to suspect that locker contained alcoholic beverages in violation of school rules);
In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (upholding
school principal's actions of opening student's locket after being informed that
locker contained marijuana). In situations when school officials suspect a violation
of school rules, they may inspect lockers themselves, or may effectively consent
on behalf of the students to inspections by law enforcement officers. See, eig.,
In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); State v. Stein,
203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1969).
130. See, e.g., In re Christopher W,, 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775
(1973) (school locker search for marijuana upheld as within duties of school
personnel); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969);
People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 NE.2d 596, 283 NY.S,2d 22 (1967).
131. See supra notes 122-30.

132. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 741 n5. But see Gillard v. Schmidt,
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strong statement regarding the expectation of privacy students enjoy
while at school; it merely rejected as untenable the state's argument
that students have no expectation of privacy."' The possibility exists
that a somewhat lower "reasonable suspicion" standard governs
locker and desk searches than the standard which applies to more
intrusive student searches.
B.

Canine Investigations

If, as in locker search cases, a student possesses little or no expectation of privacy and the fourth amendment does not apply, then
"the government enjoys a virtual carte blanche to do as it pleases. The

[government's] activity is 'excluded from judicial control and the
command of reasonableness.' ,114 The Tenth Circuit extended this
theory to uphold the use of trained narcotic detection dogs to conduct

a dragnet exploration of school lockers.' 35 The dogs were taken
through the school hallways, and when a dog repeatedly "keyed
in" on a locker, the locker was opened and searched without a
search warrant.' 36 The court denied that this procedure constituted
a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment because
school officials' joint ownership of school lockers destroyed students'
expectation of privacy in locker space, and because school officials
had the power to search lockers once a probability existed that
contraband was hidden inside.'
The Fifth Circuit also held that an exploratory investigation of
student lockers or automobiles by drug detection dogs did not con-

stitute a fourth amendment "search"'

38 ,

and referred to its previous

579 F.2d 825, 826-28 (3d Cir. 1978) (school guidance counselor maintained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his unlocked school-owned desk).
133. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 742.
134. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir.
1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983) (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 42, at 393).
135. Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981).
136. Id. at 666.
137. Id. at 670. The "probability" that contraband was contained in a locker
consisted of a reliable dog's positive reaction to a particular locker. Id.
138. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983). The search program at issue
called for the dogs to be taken on a random and unannounced basis to the school
to sniff student lockers, automobiles, and the students themselves. 690 F.2d at 474.
If a dog alerted its handler to a locker, school officials would open and search
the locker without the student's consent. Id. If a dog alerted its handler to an
automobile in the school parking lot, its owner would be asked to open the doors
and trunk. Id. If the student refused to comply, his parents would be notified.
Id.

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XIV

rulings that sniffing by dogs of luggage checked in at a bus terminal 13 9
or an airport'O did not constitute a "search" because "the passenger's
reasonable expectation of privacy does not extend to the airspace
surrounding that luggage."' 141 The court added that "[i]f anything,
one's expectation of privacy in a car is lower than in one's lug42
gage." 1

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
reached a different conclusion and ruled against the use of drug detection dogs by a school district to sniff both automobiles and students.' 4 3
The court held that dog investigations were indeed "searches" under

the fourth amendment because dogs are able to detect odors completely beyond the range of the human sense of smell.'" Conse139. United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509, 510 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
867 (1981).
140. United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 360-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 962 (1981) (reasoning that use of trained drug detection dogs to sniff
around exterior of luggage checked at airport does not constitute "search" within
meaning of fourth amendment); United Stated v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th
Cir. 1980) (due to current airport security measures, passengers retain no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their checked luggage), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981);
see supra note 60 and accompanying text. Various circuit courts also have held
that a dog's sniff does not constitute a "search" triggering fourth amendment
protection if the sniff is of various inanimate objects. See, e.g., United States v.
Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir. 1977) (lockers); United States v. Solis,
536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976) (trailers); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d
459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976) (luggage); State v. Martinez,
26 Ariz. App. 210, 547 P.2d 62, aff'd, 113 Ariz. 345, 554 P.2d 1272 (1976) (cars);
see also State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (patrol of
school parking lot which yielded drug paraphernalia in open view in student's car
held not to be fourth amendment "search").
141. United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 962 (1981).
142. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that subjecting luggage "which was
located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"). The Supreme Court narrowly stated
that "the particular course of investigation ... here-exposure of respondent's
luggage ... in a public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a search,"

id., possibly implying that dog sniffs of humans would warrant an opposite result.
The Second and Ninth Circuits support this view. See United States v. Solis, 536
F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976). At least one lower court has interpreted this
decision to mean that similar "sniff tests" may be conducted in the absence of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289,
1292 (9th Cir.) (canine sniff of luggage checked at airport does not constitute
"search" or "seizure"), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 565 (1984).
143. Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 239-41 (E.D. Tex.
1980).
144. Id. at 232-33.
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quently, the dog's sniff did not merely enhance the senses of the
school official145 but totally replaced his sense of smell, and was
used to perceive otherwise undiscoverable information.'" Applying
a fourth amendment reasonableness standard to the drug dog investigations at issue, the court held that even these minimally intrusive
searches required "articulable facts which focus suspicion on specific

students."

47 The

sniffing of automobiles was especially unreasonable

under circumstances in which students had minimal access to their
cars during a school day, and therefore, the school's interest in
48
conducting such a search was deemed clearly insignificant.
There is a sharp distinction to be drawn between the use of drug
detection dogs to sniff lockers or cars and the use of the dogs to
sniff students' bodies for contraband. 49 The Supreme Court in

T.L.O. recognized that "even a limited search of the person is a
substantial invasion of privacy." 5

0

However, since the Court refused

to review the two major circuit court decisions on canine searches
145. Id.
146. Id. But see United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 n.3 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976) (holding that dog's sniff merely enhances
police officer's sense of smell in identical way flashlight enhances officer's sight).
This is known as the "plain smell" doctrine, which is an extension of the "plain
view" doctrine discussed supra note 60 and accompanying text. Under the plain
view doctrine, police or state officials may "seize contraband or evidence of crime
which comes within their vision as they go about their business in a legitimate
fashion," reasoning that "an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in that' which he exposes to public observation." Jones v. Latexo Indep. School
Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 231 (E.D. Tex. 1980). The "plain smell" doctrine extends
the ability of state officials to search if they perceive suspicious odors. See, e.g.,
United States v. Walker, 522 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1975) (border patrol officers
justified in searching car after detecting odor of marijuana from car). For a complete
discussion of the "plain smell" doctrine and its application to school search cases,
see Pilka, Constitutionality of Canine Searches in Public Schools, 14 EDUC. L.
RPTR. 1, 12-14 (1984).
147. Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 236.

148. Id.at 235-36.
149. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d at 477. For a discussion
of the constitutionality of canine sniffs specifically in the school context, see Gardner,
Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope,
74 Nw. U.L. Rv. 803 (1980); Schimmel, Horton v. Goose Creek: Reexamining
Canine Searches in the Schools, 15 EDUC. L. RPTR. 1035 (1984); Note, Use of
Canine to Detect Drug Paraphernalia on School Children Is an Unreasonable Search
Under the Fourth Amendment, Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp.
223 (E.D. Tex. 1980), 9 Am. J. CRM. L. 127 (1981); Note, Public School Searches
and Seizures, 45 FoRDHAM L. REv. 202 (1976); Note, Dog Searches in SchoolroomsState or Private Action?, 15 VAL. U.L. REv. 137 (1980); Comment, Search and Seizure
in the Public Schools: Are our Children's Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 119 (1979).
150. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 741 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
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in public schools,' there remains a split in authority regarding the
constitutionality of using trained canines to sniff students for drugs.
The Fifth Circuit in Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School
District,' and the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas in Jones v. Latexo Independent School District,'"

both held that a canine sniff of a student's person constituted a

"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.' 5 4 In Jones,
the court held that such sniff searches "exceeded the bounds of
reasonableness" since they were conducted in a "blanket, indiscriminate manner without individualized suspicion of any kind."' 55 In
Horton, the Fifth Circuit noted that using a dog to intentionally
sniff a human body was "indecent and demeaning' ' 5 6 and that a

child could easily be shamed or embarassed at a dog's display of
excitement under these circumstances. 117 Both Horton and Jones ruled
that dragnet sniff searches of students violated the fourth amendment, 5 8 and the Horton court asserted that future dog searches
151. Horton, 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1207 (1983); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part,
remanded in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982).
152. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207
(1983).
153. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
154. In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit in Horton drew a similar
analogy as the court in Jones, stating that courts have universally held that the
use of magnetometers in airports to detect concealed weapons qualifies as a fourth
amendment "search" even though that search seems far less intrusive on a person's
expectation of privacy than do sniffs by a trained dog. 690 F.2d at 478. In Jones,
the court compared a dog sniff to an electronic listening device and also concluded
that a sniff search entailed a greater invasion of a person's privacy. 499 F. Supp.
at 232-33. However, the Jones court weighed heavily the fact that school officials
used poor judgment in using the dogs "to inspect virtually the whole Latexo school
body," including kindergarteners. Id. at 233-34; see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
supra note 3, at Supp. 247.
The Horton court rejected its prior analysis, which had led to a determination
that dog sniffs of lockers and cars were not "searches" under the fourth amendment,
as inappropriate in the context of canine sniffs of the person. 690 F.2d at 477.
The Horton and Jones courts each stated that since dog sniffs of the person
constitute fourth amendment "searches," school authorities should have had individualized suspicion of specific students, and should not have searched the entire
class of students. Horton, 690 F.2d at 481-82; Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 234-35.
155. Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 235.
156. Horton, 690 F.2d at 478 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 479; see also Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94 (7th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (Swygert, J., dissenting from order denying petition for rehearing) (stating
that canine searches of students' bodies constitute "the type of 'severe, though
brief intrusion upon cherished personal security' that is subject to constitutional
scrutiny") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982).
158. Horton, 690 F.2d at 481; Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 234-35 (dragnet search
is "anathema to the protection accorded citizens under the fourth amendment").
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should not be conducted unless school officials have "reasonable
cause" to suspect contraband was possessed by specific students.'59
In contrast, in Doe v. Renfrow,l 60 the Seventh Circuit concluded
that a dragnet canine sniff of all students and their belongings to

detect drugs did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.' 6' Even though students were not permitted
to leave their classrooms for the nearly three hour duration of the
procedure, the court rejected the argument that this constituted
a mass detention because the investigation occurred during the regular
school day. 62 While the Doe court acknowledged that requiring some
students to empty their pockets after a dog "alerted" to them did
constitute a "search," the court ruled that these searches were
constitutional because "the alert of the dog constituted reasonable
cause to believe" the students were. concealing drugs. 63 Thus, based
upon the reasoning in Doe, it appears that the general existence of
a drug use problem in a public school would justify the use of canines

to detect narcotics allegedly hidden on students' bodies.' 6"

159. Horton, 690 F.2d at 481-82; accord Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 234-35.
160. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), qff'd in part, remanded
in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022
(1982).
161. 475 F. Supp. at 1020-21. The Fifth Circuit in Horton, attempted to distinguish
the facts from those in Doe by stating that in Doe, the Seventh Circuit held that'
there was no search because the dogs did not actually touch the students, whereas
in Horton, the dogs did make physical contact with the students. 690 F.2d at 47778. As a result, a different privacy interest was invaded in the two cases. Id. at
477-79. The Horton court seemed to follow the theory that a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy does not extend into surrounding airspace, but is inherent
only in the person's body. Id. at 477-78.
162. Doe, 631 F.2d at 94 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
163. Doe, 475 F. Supp. at 1024. However, such an "alert" did not justify a
subsequent strip search of a 13 year old female student which the court deemed
to be a serious invasion of her constitutional rights. See infra notes 196-98 and
accompanying text.
164. 475 F. Supp. at 1020-22. In addition, the court referred to the minimal
intrusiveness of the dog sniffs, the fact that "a public school student cannot be
said to enjoy any absolute expectation of privacy while in the classroom setting,"
id. at 1022, and the doctrine of in loco parentis as justification for the decision
to search. Id. at 1022-23. For a discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine, see
supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
The Doe decision has been vehemently criticized at each stage of the case's
appellate progression. See, e.g., 631 F.2d at 93 (Swygert, J., dissenting); 635 F.2d
582, 584 (1980) (Chief Judge Fairchild and Circuit Judges Swygert, Wood, and
Cuhady dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); 451 U.S. 1022
(1982). Justice Brennan, dissenting from a denial of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, stated:
We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the police
and the dogs burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
C.

[Vol. XIV

Personal Searches

Personal searches 65 present situations in which a student conceivably has a higher expectation of privacy than he would in his
locker or car.' 66 However, warrantless searches of a student's person
by school officials have been repeatedly upheld where school officials
have based their actions upon a reasonable suspicion that a student
is concealing contraband. 67 Evidence obtained from these searches
that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her
teacher had hoped to convey. . . . Schools cannot expect their students
to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities
themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms.
Id.at 1027-28.
165. Personal searches can be defined as searches directed at the student's
clothing, his person, or possessions carried on his person. See O'Hara, Search and
Seizure Analysis in School Settings, 13 EDUC. L. RPTR. 1, 5 (1984). The category
includes cases in which school officials demand that the student empty pockets, a
purse, or remove some or all of his clothing. Id.
166. Id. In a related case involving a pat-down search of a traveler who refused
to empty one pocket at a border, the Seventh Circuit stated that a pat-down search,
because it "falls short of the intrusiveness associated with a strip search, is governed
by principles different from those applicable to strip searches." United States v.
Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213, 1217 (7th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Nieves, 609
F.2d 642, 646 (2d Cir.) (not every request to remove articles of clothing or to
remove object from pockets will transform a search into a strip search, because
levels of embarassment and invasiveness significantly differ), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1085 (1979); United States v. Klein, 592 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1979) (relatively
unobtrusive pat-down search held not equivalent to strip search).
167. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984) (reasonable
cause to believe search is necessary in furtherance of maintaining school discipline
and order, or duty to maintain safe environment conducive to education), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1749 (1985); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir.
1984) (reasonable belief that school officials had reasonable or probable cause to
search); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 481 (5th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (reasonable cause includes individualized suspicion), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)
(reasonable grounds consist of articulable facts, and search must be in furtherance
of legitimate school goal, such as discipline); M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp.
288, 292 (S.D. I11. 1977) ("reasonable cause to believe"); In re William G., 709
P.2d 1287, 1295, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118, 126 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) ("articulable facts,
together with rational inferences from those facts, warranting an objectively reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched are violating or have
violated a rule, regulation, or statute"); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 872 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1971) (reasonable suspicion); State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383, 1386
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("reasonable subjective suspicion supported by objective,
articulable facts" which suggest the presence of "prohibited objects or substances");
State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 496, 216 S.E.2d 586, 592-93 (1975) (reasonableness
is "considerably less than probable cause" and school officials "must be allowed
to search without hindrance or delay ... to insure that students are not whimsically
stripped of personal privacy and subjected to petty tyranny"), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1039 (1975); In re J.A., 85 II. App. 3d 567, 573, 406 N.E.2d 958, 962 (1980)
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has been held admissible in both criminal 68 and juvenile proceedings. 69
The most compelling issue arising from these cases is what degree
of certainty equals "reasonable suspicion," enabling school officials
to legally invade a student's privacy rights. 70 The T.L.O. decision
stated that courts should consider the necessity and purpose of the
7
search and weigh the extent of the invasion of privacy. 1 '
A search that entails asking a student to empty his pockets-even
if the student's compliance is not meaningfully consensual-entails
a less hostile or offensive invasion than a more physical searchwhether a mere "pat down," a search inside clothing, a strip
search, or the ultimate humiliation of a body cavity search. Nevertheless, there is not much doubt that the personal indignity of a
pockets-emptying search is real and serious. 7 2
("reasonable suspicion that a student is in possession of contraband"); People v.
Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 51, 233 N.W.2d 180, 183 (1975) ("reasonable suspicion");
Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 352, 540 P.2d 827, 832 (1975) ("reasonable suspicion
that a crime is being or has been committed" or "reasonable cause to believe that
the search is necessary in the aid of maintaining school discipline"); People v.
Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 489, 315 N.E.2d 466, 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 408 (1974)
(basis for finding sufficient cause for school search is less than basis required for
search outside school premises); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d
781, 784 (1977) (requiring reasonable grounds for the search and the search must
be necessary to maintain school discipline); State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728
(W. Va. 1985) ("articulable facts . . . provid[ing] reasonable grounds to search the

students" and the search must further a legitimate goal of school officials).
168. In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972) (search
initiated by school officials with police subsequently assisting yielded evidence later
admissible at criminal proceeding).
169. In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (1972) (search of female
student's purse and person yielded amphetamines later held admissible in juvenile
proceedings).
170. To assist in a determination of whether a "reasonable suspicion" to search
exists, courts have considered several factors as relevant. The United States Supreme
Court focused on the child's age, sex, and the nature of the infraction at issue.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 (1985). Other courts have examined:
(1) the child's history and school record; (2) the prevalence and seriousness of the
drug or violence problem in the school; (3) the exigencies in conducting a search
without delay and further investigation; (4) the probative value and reliability of
the information used as justification for the search; and (5) the particular teacher
or school official's experience with the student. See, e.g., State v. D.T.W., 425
So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 352,
540 P.2d 827, 832 (1975); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 489, 315 N.E.2d
466, 470, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 408 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81,
558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977).
171. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 742-43.
172. Buss, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 31, at 773; see also M. v. Bd.
of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (scope of intrusion was slight, merely
requiring student to empty his pockets).
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Generally, searches of purses and pockets will be upheld when
conducted by school personnel if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the sought-after contraband will be found, and when
such action is conducted to maintain school discipline.7
In one case, 174 a vice-principal saw a student out of class in violation
of a school rule. The vice-principal tried to take the student's coat
in order to prevent him from leaving the school building. 17 After
76
a brief struggle, the vice-principal had full possession of the coat.
Since the vice-principal knew from experience 7 7 that the student had
been involved with drugs, he searched the coat and found ten packets
of hashish.' 78 The court applied a reasonable suspicion standard and
79
upheld the search as valid.'
In a similar case, 80 the student had a bulge in his pocket and
repeatedly put his hand into the pocket and pulled it out.' 8' As the
student was being escorted to an administrator's office, he ran out of
the school.'8 2 An administrator caught him several blocks away and
forced the student to open his hand, disclosing a syringe and eyedropper.'
Again, this search was upheld as reasonable under the
84

circumstances.'
It has also been held that a student's "furtive movements" can
give rise to a reasonable suspicion.'85 However, the mere fact that

173. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Contra Picha v. Wielgos, 410
F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (school principal acting on phone tip contacted
police and then had several female students searched by school nurse; the court
accepted lower "reasonable suspicion" standard when search related to discipline
and safety, but required probable cause when it was essentially a criminal investigation). For a discussion of probable cause, see supra notes 55, 74.
174. State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); see also In re Bobby
B., 172 Cal. App. 3d 377, 218 Cal Rptr. 253 (1985) (holding high school dean
acted reasonably by asking students in school restroom to produce passes to be
out of class and to empty their pockets in order to discover concealed drugs).
175. 282 A.2d at 870.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 602, 280 N.W.2d 343, 351 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1979) (stating that teacher's prior experience with student can give rise to
reasonable suspicion of his present behavior).
178. 282 A.2d at 870.
179. Id. at 872.
180. People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
181. Id. at 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
182. Id. at 910, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 913-14, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
185. See State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (student's furtive motion
of jumping up and down and quickly putting something into his pants as school
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a student visited a restroom with other students on several occasions
during the day for periods of five seconds or less, was held not to
support a reasonable suspicion that the student possessed contraband.' 6 Most cases involve searches which are limited in their
intrusiveness, conducted by school officials on the basis of a tip
from a student or another informant.' 87 The information tends to
be that a student was selling drugs,' 8s or attempting to sell drugs,' 9
or that a student was keeping drugs in his locker,'19 or on his
person,' 9' or that a student had taken drugs and appeared intoxi192
cated.

A crucial legal issue is raised when school officials conduct more
invasive searches of the student's person. 93 Strip searches by school
principal approached held to create reasonable suspicion justifying valid search),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 602-03, 280 N.W.2d
343, 352 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67
(1968); People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 817-19, 478 P.2d 449, 454-56,
91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 734-36 (1970); cf. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1297, 218
Cal. Rptr. 118, 128-29 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (combined facts that a student was
out of class and engaged in "furtive gestures" in attempt to hide his calculator
case from school official provided no reasonable basis for official to search calculator
case in absence of prior knowledge relating particular student to possession, sale,
or use of contraband).
186. See People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403
(1974).
187. The information obtained from the informant typically constitutes a reasonable suspicion justifying a search of the student or students. See In re J.A.,
85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980); People v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601,
313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970); see also 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AM SEIZURE,
supra note 3, at 460.
188. See, e.g., In re Robert B., 175 Cal. App. 3d 763, 218 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1985)
(school security guard who observed student apparently engaging in drug transaction
and subsequently hiding cigarette box in his jacket had reasonable cause to detain
and search him for drugs); In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr.
682 (1972) (student informant told school official that defendant was. selling illegal
drugs on campus); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 381, 323 A.2d
145, 146 (1974) (same); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975)
(same); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (same).
189. See In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972); In re
Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (student informant
made purchase of illegal drugs from defendant at direction of school officials); In
re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (1972).
190. See In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973)
(four students informed school officials that defendant's locker contained a sack
of marijuana).
191. See M.J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Commonwealth
v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974).
192. See In re Thomas G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970)
(student informed school officials that he saw defendant swallow an illegal drug
and act intoxicated).
193. For a discussion of the emotional aftereffects of strip searches, see M.M.
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personnel have been condemned as having "no place in the school
house."' 94 In T.L.O., Justice Stevens noted that "[tio the extent
that deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside the custodial
context, it surely must only be to prevent imminent and serious
harm."' 95 In Doe v. Renfrow, 196 school officials authorized a strip
search when a trained narcotic detection dog repeatedly "alerted"
to the scent of drugs on one student. 97 The Seventh Circuit reacted
strongly to the actions taken by school officials:
It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a
nude search of a thirteen-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a
violation of any known principle of human decency. . . . [tihe
conduct herein described exceeded the "bounds of reason" by
two and a half country miles. 19
A strip search clearly involves a severe infringement of a person's
legitimate expectation of privacy in his person. Yet, the Ninth Circuit
has held that school officials need only have "reasonable cause" to
believe that the student has drugs in his possession to justify a strip
search. 199 This criterion was not satisfied by an adult observer's
report of an exchange between two students of unidentifiable material. 200 Similarly, the fact that one student entered a school restroom
with another student and exited quickly twice within one hour was

v. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (emotional trauma caused by unreasonable strip search of female student);
Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (discussed infra notes 20407 and accompanying text); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 490, 315 N.E.2d
466, 471, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407, 410 (1974) (discussing potential for psychological
damage to students inherent in strip search procedure). See also Narvaez, Principal
Extols Search Decision, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1985, at A16, col. 1 (in an interview
with James Koch, principal of Piscataway High School, site of T.L.O. incident,
Koch stated that clearly different standards would apply to strip searches than to
purse or pocket searches). See generally McKeown, Strip Searches Are Alive and
Well in America, 12 HumAN RIGHTS 36 (1985).
194. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 765 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (emphasis added). However, within one month of the Supreme Court's
decision in T.L.O., two assistant principals were disciplined for strip searching ten
junior high school students in an unsuccessful attempt to locate twenty dollars
reported as missing. Houston Chron., Feb. 16, 1985, at 1:13, col. 1.
196. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 631
F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1982).
197. 475 F. Supp. at 1024-28.
198. 631 F.2d at 92-93.
199. Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466-68 (9th Cir. 1984).
200. Id. at 1467-69.
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held not to constitute sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a
201
subsequent strip search.
The Second Circuit held that school officials had insufficient
reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search of a female student
who had a reputation for stealing when she was caught holding
another girl's purse in an empty classroom during a school fire
drill. 20 2 The court stated that although a reasonable suspicion might
justify a search of the student's pockets or purse, strip searches
were to be judged by a stricter standard: "as the intrusiveness of
the search intensifies, the standard of Fourth Amendment 'reason-

ableness' approaches probable cause.' '203
An alternative and preferable approach requires individualized suspi204
cion as an element of reasonable suspicion. In Bellnier v. Lund,
school officials strip searched an entire elementary school class because
three dollars had allegedly been stolen from one child.2" 5 School officials did not suspect a particular student. However, all the children
were ordered to strip down to their undergarments so that the officials could search their clothes for the money, which was never
located.20 6 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York held this search to be unconstitutional because "It]here
were no facts ... which allowed the officials to particularize with
respect to which students might possess the money, something which
has time and again . . . been found to be necessary to a reasonable
20 7
search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals 2 8 and the Sixth Circuit 2°9 followed
201. In People v. Scott D., the court stated that school officials' determination
that reasonable cause existed might have been correct if they had observed "accumulated instances of concentrated association with students suspected or known
to be involved in drug use or distribution." 34 N.Y.2d 483, 490, 315 N.E.2d 466,
470, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 409 (1974); see also Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91-92 (7th
Cir. 1980) (Seventh Circuit held that although initial searches of students' outer

garments were reasonable based upon canine sniffs giving rise to "reasonable suspicion," school officials did not act reasonably in strip searching a student without
further evidence).
202. M.M. v. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837, 839, aff'd, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir.
1979) (per curiam).
203. 607 F.2d at 589.
204. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
205. Id. at 49-50.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 54.
208. See Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that reasonable grounds for strip search of student existed when
student had passed prescription drugs and marijuana to fellow students).
209. Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984) (school officials who
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this reasoning in upholding student strip searches as valid, as long
as school officials had a reasonable suspicion that the specific
students possessed contraband. Both courts expressly stated that the
searches at issue were upheld because each search involved particularized suspicion of specific students for a single purpose, and no
20
general searches of other students were conducted.
D.

Urinalysis Testing

Several public school districts have introduced urinalysis testing
to screen students for drug use, thereby raising new questions about
what constitutes a "reasonable" search under the fourth amend21
ment. 1
A leading case addressing this issue was decided in 1985 by the
United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.
In Anable v. Ford,2" 2 a high school had instituted a policy of
screening any student suspected of drug or alcohol intoxication
by either blood, breath, urine, or polygraph tests. 23 Refusal to submit

observed activity reasonably believed to indicate use and sale of marijuana had
reasonable cause to search students involved), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1749 (1985).
210. Rone, 655 S.W.2d at 30; Tarter, 742 F.2d at 983.
211. See Anable v. Ford, Civ. No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion (W.D. Ark.
filed July 15, 1985). Other school districts have sought to introduce urinalysis
testing to screen for drug and alcohol abuse. The Phelps-Clifton Springs School
District in Clifton Springs, New York, voted to institute a random" urine testing
program under which all students would provide urine samples, but only a certain
percentage would be chemically analyzed. Under the school policy, parental permission is required to perform the urine tests, and the school maintains that the
program is voluntary. See Robinson, Plan for Student Drug Test in Hands of
Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1985, § 11, at 12, col. 4 (discussing judicial review
of proposed student urine testing policies in various public school systems); Student
Drug Tests to Begin, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at A46, col. 5 (discussing the

Phelps-Clifton Springs program). The Patchogue-Medford, New York school district
sought to begin a urinalysis testing program to screen 23 teachers seeking tenure
for traces of drug use. Robinson, Student Drug Tests to Begin, N.Y. Times, Nov.
17, 1985, § 11, at 12, col. 4. Under the school policy, a positive test could result
in a denial of tenure. However, compulsory tests were barred as "an impermissible
and unconstitutional search of the bodies of prospective tenure teachers." L.L
Judge Bars Testing Faculty for Drug Abuse, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1985, at A26,
col. 1. A unanimous panel of the Appellate Division, Second Department recently
affirmed this decision. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ.,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
212. Anable v. Ford, Civ. No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion (W.D. Ark.
filed July 15, 1985) and Amended Judgment (filed September 6, 1985).
213. Anable, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 2-4 (W.D. Ark. filed
July 15, 1985); see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1985, at A48, col. 5 (discussing
Norfolk, Virginia high school policy requiring students to submit to breath tests
if they are suspected of alcohol intoxication; students who refuse to take the test
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to a drug test was considered a violation of this policy.24 A student
who was expelled after a breath test and another who was expelled
after a positive urine test 2 "1 challenged the policy of mandatory drug
21 6
testing as violating their fourth and fourteenth amendment rights.
The court recognized that after T.L.O., school officials must have
at least a reasonable suspicion that a student is under the influence
of drugs before a breathalyzer test could be required. 2 7 The court
held the breath test to be constitutionally valid because "[tfaking
a student to the police station to blow into a breathalyzer machine
is little more invasive in itself than taking a child to a five-anddime store to blow up a balloon. ' 21 1 The urine test, on the other
hand, was rejected because it constituted a "search" of body fluids
under the fourth amendment. 2 9 The scope of the test was deemed
excessively intrusive,2 0 because "the test bears so little relation to
the guilt or innocence of any particular student that its use as a
determining factor ... cannot be consistent with constitutional re-

quirements. "221
Although the Arkansas school's urine testing policy ultimately
was declared unconstitutional, the policy had required administration

still can be expelled "on the basis of what the teacher smells and observes"). Id.
214. Anable, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 17 (W.D. Ark. filed July
15, 1985).
215. Id. at 1-2, 25, 35. A third student participated in the initial filing but was
excluded for a lack of standing. Id. at 25.
216. Id. at 1.
217. Id. at 28-29.
218. Id. at 31.
219. Anable, No. 84-6033, Amended Judgment at 8 (W.D. Ark. filed Sept.
6, 1985).
220. The student was forced to disrobe from the waist down, while an adult
school official of the same sex observed her giving the urine sample for testing.
Anable, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 41-42 (W.D. Ark. filed July 15,
1985).
221. Id. at 39. The court reviewed expert testimony concerning the reliability of
the Emit immunoassay test results, concluding that "results of the urine test utilized
provide very little more information regarding the event at school." Id. at 38; see
also Putting Them All to the Test, Tam, Oct. 21, 1985, at 61 (discussing inaccuracy
of Emit urine test results). A positive test result under the Arkansas school policy
would enable school officials to impose sanctions on the student even though the
test, by its nature, cannot distinguish between marijuana use at home or at school.
Anable, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 39 (filed July 15, 1985). As a
result, the court held that the urine test policy constituted an impermissible and
improper attempt by school officials to regulate off-campus conduct, especially
since the Supreme Court in T.L.O. had clearly stated that school officials could
design school policies only to "maintai[n] discipline in the classroom and on school
grounds." Anable, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 40 (citing T.L.O., 105
S. Ct. 733, 742 (1985)).

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XIV

of tests only when school administrators had some objective basis
222
to suspect specific students were involved with drugs or alcohol.
A more alarming possibility would be a general or random search
policy requiring all students to provide urine samples for chemical
analysis, even if school officials had no reason to suspect that the

students tested had any involvement with illegal drugs or alcohol.
This type of drug search policy was proposed in 1985 at Becton

Regional High School in East Rutherford, New Jersey. 223 The Board
of Education voted to include mandatory tests for drugs and alcohol
as part of each student's annual physical examination. 22 Any student
who did not complete the examination would be barred from classes. 225
Five students and their parents filed suit, arguing that the tests would
violate the fourth amendment by unnecessarily invading their privacy
rights. 226 The New Jersey Superior Court held the policy unconstitu-

222. The school policy provided, in relevant part:
Sale, distribution, use or possession of alcoholic beverages, controlled
substances, (illegal drugs), marijuana, or other materials expressly prohibited by federal, state, or local laws is not permitted by students in
school buildings, on school property, or at school functions. Also, the
sale, distribution or abusive use of prescription, patent or imitation drugs
is not permitted. A trace of illegal drugs/alcohol in one's body is a
violation of this policy.... A student may be searched where there is
reasonable suspicion that the student may be hiding evidence of a wrongdoing.
Anable v. Ford, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 2-3 (W.D. Ark. filed
July 15, 1985) (emphasis in original).
223. Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School Dist., No. C-430585E, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 9, 1985). The progression of the
Odenheim case attracted extensive media attention. See N.Y. Times, June 26, 1985,
at B5, col. 1 (stating that proposed drug testing policy will not require administrators
to turn over names of students who test positive to law enforcement authorities);
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, at B8, col. 5 (announcing school board's 5 to 4 vote
in favor of instituting mandatory urine testing policy for high school students);
School's Drug Test Plan Meets Criticism in Jersey, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1985, at
B2, col. 1 (describing opposition to testing policy from students and American
Civil Liberties Union); Jersey School's Drug Test is Blocked, N.Y. Times, Aug.
14, 1985, at B3, col. 3 (state superior court judge barred the test policy until
hearings held in September, 1985); Pro and Con: Testing for Drugs in the Schools,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, at E8, col. 1 (Becton Regional High School Board
Chairman Alfred Marbaise debating the issue against Jeffrey Fogel, representing
the American Civil Liberties Union); Hanley, Issue and Debate: The Validity of
Student Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1985, at B2, col. 1.
224. Odenheim, No. C-4305-85E, slip op. at 2-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec.
9, 1985).
225. Id.at 5.
226. Id.at 6. On August 13, 1985 a temporary restraining order enjoining the
testing of urine samples was granted. Id. at 3. On September 3, 1985, the temporary
order was extended into a preliminary injunction. Id.
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tional because it called for improper general searches of students'
227
bodies under the "guise" of a medical examination.
VI.

Invasive Body Searches in Nonschool Contexts

In examining the ramifications of forcing schoolchildren to undergo
invasive body searches, the first step is to determine whether the
student has a protectable privacy interest in his breath or body fluids:
blood and urine.22 If the fourth amendment protects an individual's
privacy with respect to his physical person, 229 to an area of private
activity, 230 and to zones of privacy drawn by his legitimate expectation
of privacy,2 1 then a person's body23 2 also ought to be protected

227. Id. at 9-10. The court stated that in evaluating a schoolchild's reasonable
expectations of privacy, it is inappropriate to draw analogies from a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy in a correctional facility or a heavily regulated
industry. Id. at 8 (distinguishing McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.
Iowa 1985), and Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D.N.J. 1985)); see supra
notes 259-70 and accompanying text.
In addition, the court in Odenheim held that the school policy failed to satisfy
the T.L.O. two-prong test. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing
two-prong test). Odenheim, No. C-4305-85E, slip op. at 9 (drug testing policy held
"not reasonably related in scope to the [instances of student drug use] which
initially justified the interference, urinalysis, in the first place" because "[sichool
policy already provide[d] for exclusion and/or suspension of students who are
involved with drug activity." Id. at 10, 9.
228. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (fourth amendment protection
not based solely on presence or absence of physical intrusion into a given place);
supra note 9 (describing two qualifications which a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" must meet to be constitutionally protected).
229. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) ("person's mere propinquity
to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give
rise to probable cause to search that person") (citing Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 62, 63 (1968)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (frisking person
constitutes serious invasion into sanctity of his person).
230. E.g., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303 (1984) (private residence
represents an area of private activity); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961) ("At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion") (citations
omitted).
231. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125-26 (1984) (warrantless
field test of package damaged and opened by Federal Express office which revealed
cocaine did not involve an expectation of privacy); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (warrantless search of lawfully seized footlocker containing contraband violated legitimate expectations of privacy); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (discussed supra note 9).
232. The Sixth Circuit stated that the fourth amendment and students' privacy
interests would clearly outweigh any interest in school discipline or order which
might be served by a "degrading body cavity search" to determine if a student
possessed contraband in violation of school rules. See Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d
977, 982-83 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1749 (1985).
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from seizure 233 and chemical examination.2 3 4

Breathalyzer and urine tests implicate the identical interests in
human dignity and privacy found to be at stake in Schmerber v.
235 in which the Supreme Court found that the fourth
California,
amendment prohibits "any such intrusions on the mere chance that
desired evidence might be obtained.

23 6

One clearly has a reasonable

and legitimate expectation that the chemical breakdown of one's
body fluids will remain private information. 23 7 Of secondary im233. Detaining and testing an individual for alcohol or illegal drug use by means
of a breathalyzer test or urinalysis constitutes a "search" triggering the protections
of the fourth amendment. See Anable v. Ford, No. 84-6033, Amended Judgment
at 7-8 (W.D. Ark. filed Sept. 6, 1985) (court held breath tests to be constitutional
but held that urine tests violated students' legitimate expectations of privacy); Allen
v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985) ("urinalysis test is a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment"). The two tests
are essentially identical to blood tests which the Supreme Court deemed "searches"
under the fourth amendment. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (urinalyis
test indistinguishable from the blood test held to fall within fourth amendment in
Schmerber). In Storms v. Coughlin, the court stated that "[a]lthough it involves
no forced penetration of body tissues, as does a blood test, [urinalysis] does involve
the involuntary extraction of body fluids. In that sense, if not literally, it is an
'intrusion beyond the body's surface.' " Id. at 1218 (citation omitted); cf. McDonell
v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (finding that "[u]rine, unlike
blood, is routinely discharged from body, so no government intrusion into body
is required to seize urine;" however, one has reasonable expectation of privacy in
the chemical content of one's body fluids, so that taking the urine specimen is a
fourth amendment "search") (discussed infra at notes 261-65 and accompanying
text). But see Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 81-82 (C.M.A. 1983) (finding that
where no physical intrusion into person's body occurs, such as stomach pumping,
catheterization or drawing blood, furnishing a urine sample is not an "intrusive
search" of body); accord Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (D.N.J.
1985) (breathalyzer and urine tests require lesser intrusions than searches involving
invasions into the body).
234. For scientific details of urinalysis test techniques, see Abney, Drug Abuse,
Courts-Martial, and Random Urinalysis-An Unworkable Combination, 27 ARIZ.
L. REv. 1 (1985); Wiesner, Urinalysis: Defense Approaches, 15 ADVOCATE 114
(1983); Note, Urinalysis: Search and Seizure Aspects, 14 ADVOCATE 402 (1982).
235. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
236. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 769-70 (emphasis added). The Schmerber
standard applied in criminal cases required probable cause to believe an offense
was committed, plus a clear indication that evidence relating to the offense would
be found in the body cavity, blood, or body tissue to be invaded. Id. at 770. In
contrast, the high school policy challenged in Anable (discussed supra notes 21122 and accompanying text) interpreted the T.L.O. "reasonableness, under all of
the circumstances" standard (discussed supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text)
to mean that school officials must hold only a reasonable suspicion that the student
had used alcohol or illegal drugs prior to administering an invasive body search
such as urinalysis. Anable, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 26-28 (W.D.
Ark. filed July 15, 1985).
237. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127; see supra note 234, infra
notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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portance is the manner in which the samples are obtained, 238 and
which attaches to a student if the test results
the potential stigma
239
are inaccurate.
The next analysis focuses on whether or not school officials can

legally justify their use of urinalysis tests as reasonable searches due to
the serious nature of the alleged infractions-drug or alcohol use
on school premises. A brief survey of how invasive searches, such
as urinalysis and blood tests, are treated in other contexts provides
valuable guidance.24 '
Prison inmates enjoy virtually no expectation of privacy in their

persons 2 2 or belongings in their cells, due to the important gov238. Proposed urinalysis testing programs allow urine specimens to be taken
outside of a hospital environment and under the supervision of nonmedical personnel.
See Anabel v. Ford, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 41-42 (W.D. Ark.
filed July 15, 1985). The Arkansas school policy required "a teenaged student to
disrobe from the waist down while an adult school official, even though of the
same sex, watche[d] the student urinate in the 'open' into a tube .

. . ."

Id. The

Supreme Court in Schmerber stressed the importance of health and safety concerns,
noticeably absent in the Arkansas program:
We are thus not presented with the serious questions which would arise
if a search involving use of a medical technique, even of the most
rudimentary sort, were made by other than medical personnel or in other
than a medical environment-for example, if it were administered by the
police in the privacy of the station house. To tolerate searches under
these conditions might be to invite an unjustified element of personal
risk of infection and pain.
384 U.S. 771-72.
239. In Anable v. Ford, the court decided that the Emit Immunoassay test
could not establish with any precision the time or date of use or the amount of
marijuana used. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. All a positive result
revealed was that the person had ingested a marijuana-like substance within the
preceding days or weeks. Anable, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 38-40
(W.D. Ark. filed July 15, 1985).
Thus, the test of a heavy or chronic marijuana user may have a positive
test result while a "newcomer" to the drug, or occasional indulger, may
register a negative test result although the occasional user had smoked
marijuana in the preceding few hours. The test results alone would cast
a heavy suspicion of guilt on the heavy home user while "exonerating"
the guilty infrequent user.
Id. at 38.
240. The second prong of the T.L.O. test, discussed supra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text, requires that the search not be "excessively intrusive in light
of the age and sex of the student and nature of the infraction." T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733, 744 (1985) (footnote omitted).
241. See infra notes 242-84 and accompanying text.
242. Body searches of prisoners occur regularly, and even the most extreme
intrusions, such as anal or genital inspections, may be conducted in the absence
of any level of suspicion that the prisoner is concealing contraband on his person.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979) (upholding policy that all prisoners
undergo body cavity search following every "contact" visit with outsiders); cf.
State v. Bayaoa, 66 Hawaii 21, 656 P.2d 1330 (1982) (reasonable basis required for
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ernment interest in maintaining security at penal institutions.", A
United States District Court in Arizona held that blood may be
extracted from prisoners suspected of taking drugs if medical personnel conduct the procedure in a hygienic environment.2 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that random urinalysis tests at a prison would be permissible
on a standard of less than probable cause, because of prisoners'
status .245

The Supreme Court has emphasized fundamental differences between a prisoner's and a schoolchild's expectations of privacy, stating
that " '[tihe prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different
circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction
and incarceration,' "2
and that "[w]e are not yet ready to hold
that the schools and prisons need be equated for the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment.

' 247

However, by its nature, a mandatory

student drug testing policy inherently assumes that students have
lower expectations of privacy in their body fluids than members of
prison officials to conduct strip searches of prisoners in non-emergency, non-contact
visit situations). See generally 1 RiNGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, supra note 54,
§ 17.4 (discussing body searches of prisoners).
243. Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). For a discussion of the relationship
between the fourth amendment and the rights of prisoners, see Note, Prisoners'
Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy: Expanding a Constricted View, 22 Hous. L.
REv. 1065 (1985) and Note, Fourth Amendment-Prison Cells: Is There A Right
to Privacy?, 75 J. CRuim. L. & CRMINOLOGY 609 (1984).
244. Ferguson v. Cardwell, 392 F. Supp. 750 (D. Ariz. 1975). In the following
cases, invasive body searches and seizures of prisoners were held constitutional, in
the face of fourth amendment challenges: United States v. Smith, 470 F.2d 377,
380 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (penile swab of arrestee); Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503, 505
(5th Cir. 1968) (penile tissue scraping of arrestee), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1123
(1969) (Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas voted to grant certiorari based
upon their dissents in Schmerber); United States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354
F. Supp. 1060, 1087 (D. Del. 1972) (pubic hair sample from prisoner), aff'd, 481
F.2d 94, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072 (1973); Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138,
147-48, 310 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (1974) (urine sample from probationer); State v.

Carthan, 377 So. 2d 308 (La. 1979) (taking of blood sample and penile discharge
smear of arrestee upheld as reasonable search because of safe and hygienic procedures

and lessened expectation of privacy due to incarceration); Darland v. State, 582 S.W.2d
452, 456 (Tex. 1979) (specimen obtained while suspect urinating held valid). Contra
State v. Gammill, 2 Kan. App. 2d 627, 585 P.2d 1074 (1978) (plucking pubic hair
sample from prisoner held unconstitutional).
245. Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also
Debating a Police Test for Drug Use, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at B6, col. 4
(District of Columbia instituted program testing arrestees for drug use and offering
results to judge at bail hearing).
246. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 742 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669
(1977)).
247. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 742.
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the general population.2 4 As a result, the school must be compared
to other special settings in which people have a lowered expectation
of privacy in their bodies.
As with prison searches, persons entering the United States at 249
a
border are subject to invasive searches, including strip searches
and invasive body cavity searches. 250 The strong government interest
in preventing contraband smuggling and the setting of the search

justify a traveler's diminished expectation of privacy at a national
border .251
Persons in the military 252 are subject to urinalysis testing programs253
248. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
249. Customs officials typically need "real" or "reasonable suspicion" that a
person is smuggling contraband to conduct a strip search. See, e.g., United States
v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1984) ("real suspicion"); United States v.
Faherty, 692 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v. Smith, 557 F.2d
1206 (5th Cir. 1977) ("reasonable suspicion"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1023 (1978);
United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); United States v.
Solimini, 560 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); see also United States v.
Moody, 649 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1981) (border search requiring pulling down
a girdle held reasonable).
250. To conduct a body cavity search, customs authorities must meet the stricter
standard of having a "clear indication" or "plain suggestion" that the person is
carrying contraband within his body. See United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235
(9th Cir.) (holding body cavity search permissible when clear indication or plain
suggestion exists of concealed contraband on person's body), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1972); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 945 (1957) (same holding); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985) (approving the prolonged detention at the border of a
suspected drug smuggler until she produced monitored bowel movement).
251. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3310 (1985).
See generally, 1 RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZuREs, supra note 54, ch. 15 (Border
and Immigration Searches).
252. The rights of privacy and freedom of expression are curtailed for members
of the military due to the "different character of the military community and ...
[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline .... ." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (first
amendment applications differ in military community); see also Goldman v. Secretary
of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Orthodox Jewish air force captain
properly forbidden by military regulations from wearing his yarmulke for religious
reasons while in uniform), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310
(1986); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) (U.S. Army's
policy of excluding homosexuals from military service did not infringe upon appellant's constitutional rights); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(U.S. Navy policy of mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct did not violate
constitutional rights to privacy or equal protection).
253. See Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983) (compulsory urinalysis
for military servicemembers held constitutional). See generally Abney, Drug Abuse,
Courts-Martial, and Random Urinalysis-An Unworkable Combination, 27 AIZ.
L. REv. 1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Abney]; Note, Urinalysis: Search and Seizure
Aspects, 14 ADVOCATE 402 (1982) (discussing validity of urinalysis under military
law).
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under which any service member may be forced to give a urine
specimen as part of a random sampling. Refusal to obey is punishable
as an offense in itself.254 Urinalysis test results are admissible in
subsequent courts-martial. 255 The rationale for according military
personnel more circumscribed fourth amendment protections than
25 6

civilians enjoy reflects conditions peculiar to a military community.

However, invasive body searches have not been confined to military

employees. 257 In the public employment context, it has been held
254. Violation of an order to provide a urine specimen may violate one of three
different provisions. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (U.C.M.J.) art. 90
(disobedience of a superior's order); id. art. 91 (insubordinate conduct toward a
warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer); id. art. 92 (failure to obey order or
regulation). Prosecution for disobedience of an order to provide a urine sample
in a criminal case was allowed. United States v. Brints, 15 C.M.R. 818 (A.B.R.
1954).
255. See Abney, supra note 253, at 6-13.
256. See Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476-77 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (upholding warrantless drug inspections conducted without probable cause);
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. 1985) (discussing
"conditions peculiar to the military community" which cause a military service
member's expectations of privacy to differ from those held by civilians).
257. See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (urinalysis
of government employees suspected of drug use conducted purely in the employment
context held reasonable under the fourth amendment). But see Jones v. McKenzie,
628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986) (school district's warrantless urinalysis drug testing of
school bus attendant without particularized suspicion or probable cause that she
used drugs violates fourth amendment).
The Supreme Court recently vacated a temporary restraining order issued by the
Ninth Circuit which had blocked a program designed to administer mandatory
blood, breath, and urine tests to the nation's railroad employees involved in accidents
or infractions. Dole v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 876 (1986);
see N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1986, § 1, col. 3; Feerick, Employee Rights and Substance
Abuse, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1986, at 2, col. 4. The six-part program authorizes preemployment testing and tests of workers involved in accidents to be conducted if
there is reasonable cause for suspicion of drug use. See BNA Daily Labor Report,
Jan. 28, 1986, at A-4. The Supreme Court decision in Dole compels every American
railroad carrier to adopt a similar policy to identify drug and alcohol abusers due
to the heavy federal regulation of the railroad industry and the nature of employment
which may endanger public safety. See also Stille, Drug Testing: The scene is set
for a dramatic legal collision between the rights of employers and workers, Nat'l
L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Rimer, State Court Officers' Unions Agree to
Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1986, at 30, col. 2 (state court officers and
clerical staff for New York City's state courts will be required to submit to urinalysis
tests for drug abuse if reasonable cause is found).
On March 3, 1986, the President's Commission on Organized Crime issued a
report on drug enforcement in America which suggested that "the Government
should test all Federal employees and should not award Federal contracts to private
employers that do not begin drug testing programs." See N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1986, at Al, col. 1; Pasztor, Crime Panel Head Qualifies Support for Drug Testing,
Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1986, § 1, at 12, col. 2 (discussing limiting the Commission's
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that in order to ensure continuing public safety, bus drivers have
no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to submitting to
28
blood and urine tests for the detection of alcohol or drug abuse.
Correctional facility employees have similarly diminished expectations of privacy 2 9 because the presence of contraband, drugs or

alcohol poses a serious threat to the internal security of an incarceration facility. 6° Although some intrusive searches might be allowed
inside the penal institution which would not be reasonable outside, 26 ,
recommendations for widespread drug testing of military and civilian government
employees and federal contractors).
In the private sector, it is estimated that as many as 25% of the large corporations
in America screen prospective employees for drug use. Drugs at Work, 72 A.B.A.
J. 34 (Mar. 1, 1986) (discussing challenges to employee testing policies); Rothstein,
Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11 EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS L.J. 422 (1985-86); Bishop, Worker Drug Tests Resisted: Coast Cases
Are Watched, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at Dl, col. 3 (discussing test case in
San Francisco challenging company's selection process for distinguishing certain
employees to undergo drug tests on basis of job classification); Battling Drugs On
the Job, TrmE, Jan. 27, 1986, at 43 (quoting official at National Institute on Drug
Abuse that "Injearly half of all the FORTUNE 500 firms are expected to have
programs in place within a year to identify abuse and rehabilitate employees at
company expense"); Putting Them All to the Test: Does Wider Screening Mean
Narrower Freedoms?, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 61 (presenting divergent views of
policies underlying drug testing). ,
258. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.)
(rules requiring bus drivers to submit to urine tests following involvement in serious
accidents held constitutional), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
259. "[S]ociety is prepared to recognize as reasonable the proposition that correction officers have diminished expectations of privacy in light of the difficult
burdens of maintaining safety, order and security that our society imposes on those
who staff our prisons." Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council
82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 823 (1974) ("central to all other corrections goals is the institutional
consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves");
United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir.) (expectations of privacy
differ in various locations and circumstances), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 158 (1984);
McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (correctional facility
security considerations reduce scope of normal expectations of privacy); Bautista,
Sheriff. Check All Officials for Drugs, The Record (Bergen County, N.J.), Jan.
27, 1986, at Al, col. 3 (Passaic County, N.J. drug testing program requiring
sheriff's employees, including all guards, court attendants, and clerks, to submit
to drug tests, resulted in resignations of four employees).
260. See, e.g., United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579, 582 (2d Cir. 1976) (major
narcotics conspiracy "hatched" in federal penitentiary), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907
(1977); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 967 (D.R.I. 1977) ("Prison
officials estimate that 70-80% of inmates in Maximum are current drug users,
including perhaps 40 heroin addicts. The traffic in contraband is a major cause
of violence."), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
261. See Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey,
737 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1984) (strip searches and body cavity searches of correction
employees may be conducted if a standard of reasonable suspicion is met).
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"prison employees do not lose all of their Fourth Amendment rights
at the prison gates. ' 26 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa scrutinized a department of corrections
policy which subjected correction officers to searches of their vehicles,
urinalysis and blood tests.263 The court held that these invasive searches
had to be justified by a "reasonable suspicion, based upon specific
objective facts,

' 26

attesting to the employee's on-the-job involvement

65
with alcohol, controlled substances, or weapons.1
In contrast, the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey held that race horse jockeys must obey state racing
commission regulations providing for the administration of breathalyzer tests to detect blood alcohol content and random urinalysis
tests to discover usage of alcohol and controlled substances. 266 The
court found that jockeys have "significantly diminished expectations
of privacy ' 267 due to the "pervasive and continuous regulation [of
the horse racing industry] by the state. ' 268* In applying "the reasonableness test ' 269 to evaluate the jockey drug test procedures, the

262. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (citing Armstrong v. New
York State Comm'r of Correction, 545 F. Supp. 728, 730 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasis
in original); see infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
employed virtually identical language in the context of students' first amendment
rights. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) ("[i]t can hardly be argued that ... students ... shed their constitutional
rights ... at the schoolhouse gate").

263. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1122.
264. Id. at 1132. In McDonell, administrators at the Men's Reformatory at
Anamosa had received confidential information that an employee suspected of drug
smuggling had associated with people outside the facility who were under police
surveillance for their drug-related activities. Id. at 1126. McDonell refused to submit
to a urinalysis test and was dismissed. Id.
265. Id. at 1126; see Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council
82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d at 208 (stating that random searches of correction officers
are unreasonable).
266. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985). State regulations
require licensed jockeys to take a breathalyzer test daily and between three and
five jockeys chosen nightly at random after the races must submit to urinalysis
tests. Id. at 1093. A jockey may be required to provide a urine sample at a
maximum of three times within a seven day period. Id. at 1096. Penalties for a
positive test include fines, enrollment in a treatment program, and expulsion from
racing in New Jersey. Id. at 1095. The three stated purposes of the regulations
are: (1) to increase the safety of the participants in a race; (2) to promote the
integrity of the racing industry; and (3) to rehabilitate drug and alcohol abusers.
Id. at 1093. *On July 10, 1986, the Third Circuit affirmed the Shoemaker decision,
but limited its holding to voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry. 795
F.2d 1136, 1142 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
267. 619 F. Supp. at 1102.
268. Id. State regulation of the horse racing industry exists due to the grave
risks of serious injury. Id.
269. Id. at 1100. The test consists of weighing "the legitimate government interest
in maintaining the integrity of the racing industry and the safety of the sport
against the legitimate expectations of privacy retained by jockeys ....

."

Id.
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court relied on the fact that the tests were uniformly administered
to all licensed jockeys in the state and noted that this procedural
safeguard "substitut[ed] for the lack of any individualized suspi70
cion."
In a similar decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld a police department regulation providing that any
department official may order any member of the force to submit
to urinalysis testing upon suspicion of drug abuse.27' The court
determined that a police officer may have a lesser privacy interest
in his person than that of the general public under certain
circumstances272 because "the police force is a para-military organization dealing hourly with the general public in delicate and often
dangerous situations. "273

In contrast, the Fifth District Court of Appeals of Florida struck
down a city policy which mandated random urinalysis testing of
police officers and firefighters because it violated fourth amendment
rights.2 74 The court held that unless tests are part of annual physical
270. Id. at 1103. The court distinguished McDonell, see supra notes 262-64 and
accompanying text, stating that because breathalyzer and urine tests at issue in
Shoemaker are less intrusive than body cavity or strip searches in McDonell,
individualized suspicion was not needed in Shoemaker as in McDonnell to justify the
lesser invasion. 619 F. Supp. at 1101. In addition, in Shoemaker, the regulations were
administered in accordance with established standards which did not rest all discretion
in the hands of unnamed authorities. Id. at 1103, 1106-07. In contrast, the policy
at issue in McDonell did not identify who had the authority to require an officer
to submit to a search, nor did the policy establish standards for the actual test
procedures. See 612 F. Supp. at 1126.
271. Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008-09 (D.C. 1985).
The testing program in Turner resembles in some respects the testing policy for
corrections officers in McDonell, discussed supra notes 262-64. In Turner, a member
of the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons could, at his discretion, order the tests.
500 A.2d at 1006. Nevertheless, the policy "does not grant the Department carte
blanche to order testing on a purely subjective basis." 500 A.2d at 1008. There
must be a "reasonable, objective basis for medical investigation through urinalysis,"
which may fall short of the traditional requirement of probable cause. Id. at 100809. In McDonell, no written standards dictated who had the authority to order
the tests or how the tests were to be administered. 612 F. Supp. at 1126; see also
Alex, Paterson Chief: Drug Tests for All Police, The Record (Bergen County,
N.J.), Jan. 31, 1986, at BI, col. 3 (discussing a Paterson, N.J., Police Department
order for all recruits to undergo urinalysis for drug use; similar testing instituted
by the Newark, N.J., Police Department, and at New Jersey police training academies).
272. Turner, 500 A.2d at 1008. A concurring opinion suggested that at best, a
urinalysis test is minimally intrusive. Id. at 1011 (Nebeker, J., concurring). "[B]ody
waste is forever discarded upon release from the body. An individual cannot retain
a privacy interest in a waste product that, once released, is flushed down the
drain." Id.
273. 500 A.2d at 1008.
274. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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examinations, the city must have a "reasonable suspicion" that the
employee is using a controlled substance before drug testing can
occur. 27 The court stressed that random drug tests are onerous

because:
[w]ithout a scintilla of suspicion directed toward them, many
dedicated firefighters and police officers are told, in effect, to
submit to such testing and prove themselves innocent, or suffer
disciplinary action. When the immediate end sought is weighed
against the private right affected,7 6the proposed search and seizure
is constitutionally unreasonable.
A schoolchild is not legally equivalent to a prisoner 2 77 because
every student has a recognizable privacy interest in his person which

is protected by the fourth amendment. 278 Although in school search
cases courts typically emphasize the importance of maintaining a
drug and alcohol-free environment,

279

these safety concerns clearly

do not approach the level of the government's interest in preserving
security in a prison facility or at a border entry point. 280 However,
due to compulsory education laws, 28 ' and the importance of discipline
App. 1985); see Marcotte, Drug Testing, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1986, at 20. The
random testing policy invalidated in Bauman resembles the urinalysis program in
McDonell which also did not identify the person by name or position who would
be authorized to require the employee to provide a urine specimen, or any standards
for the policy's implementation. 612 F. Supp. at 1126; see Bauman, 475 So. 2d
at 1325; see also supra notes 263-65, 270 and accompanying text.
275. 475 So. 2d at 1325.
276. Id. at 1325; accord Turner, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) (discussed supra notes
271-73 and accompanying text). In Turner, the court upheld a city policy requiring police
officers to submit to drug tests on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the officer
used drugs, reasoning that "in the context of current widespread, large scale drug
usage in all segments of the population, the Department was justified in promulgating
Special Order 83-21 in an effort to prevent the illicit use of narcotics by members
of the police force." 500 A.2d at 1008 (emphasis added). The court in Bauman
expressly criticized this rationale:
[Tihe Chief of Police has received no information ...

that any member

of the Palm Bay Police Department has used marijuana. The incidence
of known marijuana use among fire fighters ...

even after urine testing,

is less than six (6) people. While not suggesting that this figure is
insignificant, it is hardly a legal springboard for, the [random testing]
the City now seeks to [implement].
475 So. 2d at 1325 (emphasis in original).
277. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 742 (1985) (quoting Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977)).
278. See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (presenting judicial and school
administrators' views regarding the need to conduct student searches).
280. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 742 (1985).
281. See supra note 4.
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and order to the educational setting,2 2 the school may be compared
to an industry or institution that is heavily regulated by the government.
Yet, courts which evaluate programs instituted to combat drug or
alcohol abuse by employees of heavily regulated industries, or by
police and fire department employees, primarily focus on the immediate concerns that substance abusers may jeopardize the public
welfare and endanger their own lives.2 3 Employees in these fields,
military servicepeople and travelers crossing national borders constructively waive their privacy interest in varying degrees as a precondition to their work or actions.2 4 An identical diminished
expectation of privacy should not be unilaterally imposed on students
merely because they attend public schools.
V11.

Recommendations

Many types of student search incidents28 have occurred at public
schools as a result of school administrators' efforts to combat student
substance use.286 As one court noted, "[t]here is no doubt about
it-searches and seizures can yield a wealth of information useful
to the searcher. (That is why King George III's men so frequently

282. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 258-73 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v.
Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 201-02 n.23 (2d Cir. 1984) (notice provided to correction
facility employees in rule book issued prior to employment stating that while on
facility property employees were subject to being searched, necessarily diminished
their subjective expectations of privacy significantly); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619
F. Supp. 1089, 1102 (D.N.J. 1985) (licensed participants in regulated industries
have diminished expectations of privacy due to the restrictions placed upon them).
The standard established by the Supreme Court is that a person who relies on
consent to justify the lawfulness of a search must prove the consent was freely
and voluntarily given. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973).
The totality of the surrounding circumstances must be reviewed; including evidence
that the person had knowledge of his right to refuse to grant his consent. Id. at
226-27, 248-49; see United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1977)
(search of prison employee's lunch bag held reasonable because large posted sign
which employee passed daily stated that all persons entering prison were subject
to search). But see Armstrong v. New York State Comm'r of Correction, 545 F.
Supp. 728, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) ("careful factual inquiry must be undertaken in
order to determine whether consent is voluntary under the circumstances") (citing
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
285. See supra notes 122-33 (locker searches); supra notes 135-64 (canine investigations); supra notes 165-92 (personal searches); supra notes 192-210 (strip searches);
supra notes 211-27 (urinalysis testing), and accompanying text.
286. See supra note I for a discussion of the prevalence of substance use
among students.

680

FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. XIV

searched the colonists.) That potential, however, does not make a
'2
87
... search ... a constitutionally reasonable one.
The question of what does make a student search constitutionally
reasonable under the fourth amendment has only been superficially
addressed by the Supreme Court. 28 T.L.O. established a two part
"reasonable suspicion" standard and applied it to uphold a warrantless search of a purse when there was less than probable cause
to believe the student possessed contraband in violation of school
rules. 28 9 A later federal district court decision interpreted the "reasonable suspicion" standard to bar more invasive urinalysis tests
instituted to screen students specifically suspected by school authorities of being under the influence of controlled substances. 290 A
logical extension of this reasoning indicates that an invasive body
search policy, such as one requiring urinalysis testing when there is
no individualized suspicion of the students to be tested, should clearly
be unconstitutional. This was a New Jersey Superior Court's holding. 291
Similar rulings that student searches are unconstitutional, based upon
the absence of individualized suspicion, have been reported with
2 94
3
respect to canine searches, 292 strip searches, 29 and luggage searches.

287. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (see supra
note 264).
288. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). The Court addressed
"only the questions of the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches
conducted by public school officials and the application of that standard to the
facts of this case." 105 S. Ct. at 736. The Court based its decision in part on
the minimal intrusiveness of the search in question and the presence of individualized
suspicion that the particular student had violated a school rule. Id. at 744 n.8,
746-47. The Court refused to specify what standard would apply to searches of
students' lockers or desks, id. at 741 n.5, or whether school authorities can conduct
searches in the absence of individualized suspicion. Id. at 744 n.8; see also Waits,
New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Questions the Court Did Not Answer About School
Searches, 14 J. L. & EDUC. 421 (1985).
289. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744; see supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text; see
also Quick, The School Administrator's Guide to Search and Seizure, 14 J. L. &
EDUC. 409 (1985) (practical reference guide detailing factors which combine to form
"reasonable suspicion" permitting school officials to search under T.L.O.).
290. Anable v. Ford, No. 84-6033, Memorandum Opinion at 42-43 (W.D. Ark.
filed July 15, 1985); see supra notes 209-19 and accompanying text.
291. Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School Dist., No. C-430585E, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 9, 1985).
292. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1022 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see supra
notes 161-64 and accompanying text; Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist.,
690 F.2d 470, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (distinguishing canine sniffing
of school lockers, which was deemed not a fourth amendment "search" from
canine sniffing of persons, which was held a "search" requiring individualized
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One court has explained the significance of how individualized
suspicion relates to the constitutionality of a search: "In any sufficiently large group, there is a statistical probability that someone
will have contraband in his possession. The Fourth Amendment
demands more than a generalized probability; it requires that the
suspicion be particularized with respect to each individual searched.' '291
The philosophical underpinnings of the fourth amendment support
suspicion), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); supra notes 138-42, 156-59 and
accompanying text; Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 235
(E.D. Tex. 1980) (requiring individualized suspicion prior to canine sniffing of
students); supra notes 143-48, 154, 158 and accompanying text.
Doe supported canine searches of the entire school population based upon school
officials' generalized suspicion that students possessed drugs. However, the Seventh
Circuit did not regard dog sniffs as "searches." A "search" occurred when students
were asked to empty their pockets or remove clothing after a dog "alerted" to
them-the dog sniff provided the necessary reasonable individualized suspicion that
these students possessed drugs. Jones, on the other hand, criticized this view and
held that dog sniffs constituted fourth amendment "searches" and that some
individualized suspicion was necessary before a dog could be used to sniff a person.
In Horton, the Fifth Circuit concluded that because school officials lacked individualized suspicion, the sniff search of students was unconstitutional.
293. See Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that school
officials must have reasonable particularized suspicion as prerequisite to valid search
for stolen money); see also In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1299, 221 Cal. Rptr.
118, 130-31 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (citing Hentoff, The Day The Girls of Elyria
Were Strip-Searched, The Village Voice (N.Y.), June 18, 1985 at 25, col. 3. After
finishing gym class at a junior high school in Elyria, Ohio, one of the girls told
her teacher that her watch and ring were missing. Id. Acting on what the school
superintendent would later call "reasonable deliberation of critical issues at hand,"
the gym teacher proceeded to search the lockers and purses of each of the 20 girls
in the class. Id. Other female school officials joined her in conducting body searches
of each student. Id. The allegedly stolen jewelry was never found. Id. A local
newspaper observed that "[t]heft is serious business-but to ask 20 girls to take
off most of their clothing in the hope that one guilty party will be found, goes
beyond common sense, and is an affront to the innocent . . . ." Id.)
294. See T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 741 ("searches of closed items of personal luggage
are intrusions on protected privacy interests"); Kuehn v. Renton School Dist. No.
403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (en banc) (invalidating high school
policy requiring all band members to submit to luggage searches by parent chaperones
or forego participation in overnight concert trips' for lack of individualized suspicion); cf. State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding
policy allowing teacher's aide to patrol school parking lot looking for drug paraphernalia in the absence of any suspicion that a vehicle contained contraband).
295. Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 599, 694 P.2d at 1081; see also State v. Helmka,
86 Wash. 2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115, 117 (1975) (supporting the proposition that
"we never authorize general, exploratory searches"); Marx, Drug Foes Aren't High
on Civil Liberties, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at A15, col. 2 (editorial presenting
sociological perspective regarding mandatory drug testing). Contra Stern v. New
Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (observation of
student purchasing marijuana from another student from behind two-way mirror
installed in boys' restroom did not violate students' fourth amendment rights).
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an individualized suspicion requirement. In Ybarra v. Illinois,29 the
Supreme Court noted that "a person's mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more,
give rise to probable cause to search that person." 29 In United
States v. Afanador,29 the Fifth Circuit stated that "[liest there be
any doubt ... 'reasonable suspicion' must be specifically directed
to the person to be searched." 29
The T.L.O. court refused to decide whether its "reasonable suspicion" standard included individualized suspicion." However, T.L.O.
presented a case in which school officials did have individualized
suspicion of the student and conducted a minimally invasive search.
When more invasive searches are conducted, a different formulation
of "reasonable suspicion" must be employed, and the T.L.O. Court
strongly implied that individualized suspicion would be required under
30°
the fourth amendment:
Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are
generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated
by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the
field.' -302

296. 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (mass investigatory detention, interrogation, and search
of bar patrons).
297. Id. at 91 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968)); see also
Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (citing Ybarra to support the Court's traditional "abhorrence of
unfocused, generalized, information-seeking searches"); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721 (1969) (mass detention and fingerprinting of men fitting general description
of perpetrator of crime); People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 480, 674 P.2d 240,
244, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538, 542 (1984) ("Our state and federal Constitutions were
written precisely to outlaw . . . unrestricted general sweeps and searches").

298. 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
299. Id. at 1331 (concluding that fourth amendment does not permit any automatic
transference of suspicion).
300. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 n.8 (1985).
301. Id.; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 494 U.S. 85, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, Blackmun,
J.J., Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "in place of the requirement of 'individualized suspicion' as a guard against arbitrary exercise of authority, we have
the determination of a neutral and detached magistrate [in a search warrant] that
a search was necessary."); In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1299-1300, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 118, 129-31 (1985) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (expressly
urging a judicial adoption of an individualized suspicion element as part of the
reasonable suspicion standard established in T.L.O. to govern warrantless school
searches).
302. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. at 744 n.8 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654-55 (1979)).
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VIII. Conclusion
Although the fourth amendment guarantees a student's legitimate
expectation of privacy, current legal standards permit public school
authorities to search a student's person and possessions if the conduct
is deemed "reasonable, under the circumstances." The vagueness of
the term "reasonableness" becomes crucial when school officials
seek to use this standard to justify invasive body searches, which
require extreme invasions of a child's dignity and privacy.
Public school attendance, which is mandated by state education
laws, should not automatically subject students to severe encroachments upon their constitutionally protected expectations of privacy.
In order to provide an additional safeguard to students, "reasonableness" should be uniformly interpreted to require that school
officials possess individualized suspicion of specific students prior
to conducting a valid search.303 Under no circumstances should generalized, exploratory, or random drug or alcohol screening searches
be permitted in public schools, because "[t]he problem of drug abuse
in the schools is not to be solved by conducting school house raids
on unsuspecting students absent particularized information regarding
drug users or suppliers." 3°4
Jill I. Braverman

303. See In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1299-1300, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118, 12931 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
304. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. at 1022 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).

